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Settling Beyond the Shadow of the Law:
How Mediation Can Make the Most of Social
Norms
SCOTT R. BELHORN*
Casual treatment of the subject in the literature of sociology
tends to assume that the object of mediation is to make the parties
aware of "social norms" applicable to their relationship and to
persuade them to accommodate themselves to the "structure"
imposed by these norms. From this point of view, the difference
between a judge and a mediator is simply that the judge orders the
parties to conform to the rules, while the mediator persuades them to
do so. But mediation is commonly directed, not toward achieving
conformity to norms, but toward the creation of the relevant norms
themselves. **
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal theories frequently presume that only a sufficiently powerful,
centralized authority can enforce socially efficient rules. Great-grandfather to
this theory of social order is Thomas Hobbes, who famously declared that the
absence of a "common Power" would make "the life of man, solitary, poore,
nasty, brutish, and short."1 While a centralized state is clearly necessary to
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** Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 307-
08 (1971). This Note takes as its starting point concerns over the moral structure of the
law, particularly the law's place in determining the larger social order-issues which
Professor Fuller spent a lifetime considering. Not coincidentally, Fuller distinguished
himself by his serious appraisal of mediation during its formative years when "mediation
was the exception rather than the rule in conflict management." Marc Hertogh, The
Conscientious Watermaster: Rediscovering the Interactional Concept of Law, in
REDISCOVERING FULLER 365, 368 (Willem J. Witteveen & Wibren van der Burg eds.,
1999). For discussion of Fuller's contributions to mediation, see id. at 367-71. See also
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achieve certain conditions for human harmony, this tradition has produced a
corollary line of reasoning that is much less convincing: It implies, at its
extreme, that only by resort to a central authority can society create and
maintain socially efficient rules.2
Among its myriad adherents through the ages, traditional law and
economics unselfconsciously absorbed this instrumentalist 3 conception of
social utility into many of its leading theories.4 These scholars nevertheless
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of
ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 13-23 (2000). In the spirit of Fuller's
contributions, this Note attempts to stake out a place for a moral conception of the social
order firmly rooted in the human capacity for facilitative and reciprocal self-ordering.
I THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (Collier Books 1962) (1651).
2 Robert Cooter has termed this traditional view of social order as "legal centrism."
He argues that this conception of the law suffers many of the same defects as centrally
planned market economies. Robert Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy:
The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1643, 1644-46(1996).
3 Although "instrumentalism" connotes a complex body of pragmatic legal
philosophy, I use the word simply to mean any theory of the law that treats legal rules as
the best or only means to solve collective action problems. See Milton C. Regan, How
Does Law Matter?, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 265, 265 (1998).
4 For discussion, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 137-47 (1991). See also Robert C. Ellickson, Law and
Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 539-42 (1998). Ellickson
argues that the "founders of classical law and economics" movement (including Ronald
Coase, Guido Calabresi, and Richard Posner) "exaggerated the role of law in the overall
system of social control." Id. at 537. This had several effects. First, law and economics
underestimated rational actors' capacity for self-constraint, their willingness-even at
personal cost-to inflict on others non-legal social sanctions (ostracism, gossip, "tit-for-
tat"), and their long-term interest in protecting their reputation and perceived self-worth.
Id. at 539-42. For a discussion of how non-legal sanctions affect the creation and
enforcement of contracts, see generally David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in
Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REV. 375 (1990). Second, traditional law and
economics tended to overestimate actors' knowledge of the law and their relative concern
for legal sanctions.
Outside the law and economics movement, economists increasingly emphasize the
impact of privately enforced social norms on market behavior. Many economists now
recognize that, "if we are to explain the existence and survival of some of the
fundamental institutions of a market economy, we need a richer model of human beings
than is provided by the rational, self-interested agent of neo-classical theory." Robert
Sugden, Normative Expectations: The Simultaneous Evolution of Institutions and Norms,
in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 73, 75 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman
eds., 1998) [hereinafter ECONOMICS, VALUES]. See generally ECONOMICS, VALUES,
supra; FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
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revolutionized legal theory by recognizing that legal rules create incentives
that may be analyzed analogously to price theory. Recognizing that legal
rules constrain individual rational choice, they attempted to analyze
mathematically the individual and cumulative consequence of these rules.
However, these scholars were also prone to exaggerate the probability that
non-experts would heed legal rules.5 Worse still, they could be downright
blind to other, equally powerful incentives operating on rational choice.6
PROSPERITY (1995); REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD
CONDUCT (Daniel B. Klein ed., 1997) [hereinafter REPUTATION].
5 See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 39-
52 (2d ed. 1989) (hypothesizing that people assess their risks of driving and crossing the
street according to legal theories of negligence); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987). The authors
generally attribute powerful, behavior-altering incentives to discrete alterations in tort
law. According to them, tort rules ideally encourage individuals to invest in measures to
prevent harm to others only up to the point where the cost of doing so does not exceed the
benefits from avoiding injury. The logical consequence of this approach to law is that a
rational person will obey the law only if the benefits of doing so outweigh the probable
costs. Id.
6 Somewhat unfairly, perhaps, Ronald Coase's hypothetical demonstration of his
famous principle (the so-called Coase Theorem) is generally regarded by social norm
scholars as a notorious example. ELLICKSON, supra note 4, at 2-4; see also Robert D.
Cooter, Against Legal Centrism, 81 CAL. L. REv. 417, 419-22 (1993); Ellickson, supra
note 4, at 540-41. Coase argued that as long as transaction costs remain zero and
information is reliable, resources will be allocated optimally, no matter which party faced
legal liability. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). In
a famous thought experiment, Coase considered the relationship between a hypothetical
set of ranchers and farmers. According to Coase, the law of trespass, which places
liability on a rancher for his intruding cattle, might be inefficient in a region with many
ranchers and few farmers. In such a place, it would be less costly if the ranchers paid to
fence the farmers out. The ranchers could then let their cattle roam freely. In a world
without transaction costs, a private contract such as this would be more efficient than the
default tort rule. The problem with Coase's argument always lay with transaction costs
being almost certainly greater than zero. Most law and economics scholars therefore
presumed that centralized legal rules tend to place incentives on the party in the best
position to prevent or cure them.
A prominent study by Ellickson found an even greater difficulty with the meaning
generally attributed to the Coase theorem-the proposition that, as transaction costs
increase, so do people's incentives to conform their behavior to rules of law. In a study of
actual ranchers in Shasta County, California, Ellickson found that patterns of social
behavior between neighbors-the very stuff that falls under the law and economics rubric
of "transaction costs"--actually led his subjects to ignore the law altogether. Ellickson's
fieldwork showed that cattlemen in Coase's hypothetical situation tended to resolve
disputes informally without invoking either tort or contract law. Social norms of
"neighborliness" and community reputation, and not legal rules, best predict rancher
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More recently, scholars from within the law and economics movement
have exposed some of the errors and over-generalizations of these traditional
theories.7 Applying insights from sociology and psychology,8 these scholars
have identified extra-legal incentives and non-rational cognitive biases that
further influence decisionmaking. Among their contributions has been the
realization that people frequently resolve their disputes not by applying legal
rules, but rather according to customary practice, or social norms.
The term "social norm" broadly encompasses a vast array of behaviors.9
Whether a behavior qualifies as a social norm depends not on any intrinsic
quality, but rather on how a community rewards or sanctions those who
behavior. In Shasta County, if a rancher's cattle wander onto the property of a farmer,
local custom obligates that farmer to notify the owner and to care for the cattle at his own
cost, until the owner is able to retrieve them. Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle:
Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 673-75
(1986). Ellickson found that even insurance adjusters (non-ranchers ostensibly
knowledgeable about the law) voluntarily choose not to enforce legal rights that are
contrary to the ranchers' local customs. ELLICKSON, supra note 4, at 94-97.
7 The literature is large and growing. Book-length contributions to the subject
include ELLICKSON, supra note 4, and ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000);
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). To date, no less than
four symposia published in major law reviews have addressed the issue of social norms.
Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); Symposium,
Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
537 (1998); Symposium, The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000);
Symposium, Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001).
8 An important psychological theory that is regarded as crucial by scholars of social
norms is the concept of bounded rationality. See ELLICKSON, supra note 4, at 157;
POSNER, supra note 7, at 44-46; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075-84 (2000). Human beings maximize their cognitive abilities to
assess costs and predict changes in their environment by the "unconscious use of
heuristics." Id. at 1076. Although not perfectly accurate representations, these schema are
functional calculations that efficiently conserve the time and effort otherwise depleted by
more attentive decisionmaking.
The field of cognitive psychology has developed the concept of "script theory."
Empirical evidence suggests that people frequently engage in behavior that may be
objectively described as "rational," even though they do not possess sufficient knowledge
to logically deduce why their behavior is efficient. When engaging in such behavior,
people appear subconsciously effected by environmental stimuli-including, crucially,
the behavior of others. See Paul J. Heald & James E. Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77
VA. L. REV. 1127, 1151 (1991).
9 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 4, at 185-204 (discussing extra-legal norms that
predict the treatment of cattle trespass among Shasta County ranchers, contract
enforcement among close-knit Wisconsin businessmen, and 19th-century whaling
practices better than contemporaneous legal rules).
984
[Vol. 20:3 2005]
MEDIATION AND SOCIAL NORMS
display the behavior.' 0 Where a group's members interact over time-
thereby creating a web of valuable, interdependent relationships-
characteristic patterns of behavior tend to emerge. When a group encourages
some behavior, either by providing incentives for conformity or else
sanctioning deviants, then that behavior qualifies as a social norm. Social
norms are public goods in so far as they solve collective action problems."I
But just as legal rules mete out damages to those who break them, failure to
conform to social norms can sometimes exact costly social penalties enforced
by other members of the group. 12
10 Normative standards encompass a wide range of socially conditioned information,
ranging from moral judgments (do not lie), to community norms (do not smoke near
others), to shared values within a discrete nuclear family (if communicating entails
bickering, avoid communicating), to industry-wide practices (construction site risks
should be born by contractors). In a review of the scholarly literature, Aviram has pointed
out the considerable disagreements over just how "social norms" should be defined. See
Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal
Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 5 n.5 (2004). Aviram cites Cooter, supra note 2, at
1656-57 (defining social norms as obligations); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law
and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1999) (defining social norms as "all
rules and regularities concerning human conduct, other than legal rules and
organizational rules"); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation
of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (defining social norms as "informal social
regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of
duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both"); Eric A. Posner, Law,
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996) (defining social
norms as rules that distinguish desirable and undesirable behavior while giving a third
party the authority to punish those engaging in undesirable behavior); Lior J. Strahilevitz,
Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359,
363-64 n.24 (2003) (defining social norms as "behavioral regularities that arise when
humans are interacting with each other, regardless of whether that interaction is face-to-
face"); and Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
914 (1996) (defining social norms as "social attitudes of approval and disapproval,
specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done").
" See Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms with
Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECoN. 369, 370 (1999). According to
Posner and Rasmusen, "A norm is even more of a public good than a law, because no one
person or political party can claim credit for creating a norm." Id. However, norms are
only ever enforced voluntarily. Frequently, such enforcement exacts reciprocal
("bilateral" or "multi-lateral") costs on the agents who enforce them. Since norm
enforcement is typically a two-edged sword, the external costs of enforcement must be at
least equal to the value of preserving the norm.
12 Id. at 370-77. Posner and Rasmusen outline six types of sanctions: (1) automatic
sanctions (violating the norm is inherently costly-for example, driving on the wrong
side of the road); (2) guilt (internal feelings experienced during or after norm-violation);
(3) shame (internal feelings experienced when one discovers that others know about
985
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Among its benefits, social norm theory can account for behaviors that are
inexplicable by rational-choice models that posit state intervention as the
only extrinsic check on self-interested behavior.13 In a more positive sense,
social norms provide their own incentives on behavior that may interact with
legal incentives in complex, sometimes unpredictable ways. 14 Part of their
unpredictability stems from the fact that norms tend to persist even when the
self-interested rationale for them has abated.15
Consider, for example, the simple social norm of leaving tips.' 6 Social
norm theory explains why vacationers leave tips at restaurants to which they
one's violation of a norm); (4) informational sanctions (an enforcing agent signals--or,
as in the case of blackmail, threatens to signal-information about the violator that he
would prefer others not know); (5) bilateral costly sanctions (an agent who discovers the
norm-violation spends resources to punish the violator-revenge is a classic example);
(6) multilateral costly sanctions (once the norm-violation is discovered, multiple agents
spend resources to punish the violator--ostracism and gossip are classic examples). Id.
13 The practice of identifying and analyzing social norms has long been used by
sociologists to explain the social control of individual behavior. The innovation of
rational choice models (also called "game theory") now provides greater analytic
precision for the study of social norms. See Ellickson, supra note 4, at 542.
14 Eric A. Posner has described the relationship between social norms and legal rules
as a dynamic interaction between background and foreground:
The law is always imposed against a background stream of nonlegal regulation--
enforced by gossip, disapproval, ostracism and violence-which itself produces
important collective goods. The system of nonlegal cooperation is always in some
ways superior and in other ways inferior to the legal solution, and legal intervention
will undermine or enhance the background norms of nonlegal cooperation in
complex ways. The desirability of a proposed legal rule, then, does not depend only
on the existence of a collective action problem on the one hand, and competently
operated legal institutions on the other hand. It also depends on the way nonlegal
systems always already address that collective action problem and the extent to
which legal intervention would interfere with those nonlegal systems.
POSNER, supra note 7, at 4.
15 If adherence to a social norm is efficient most of the time, it is likely to become
habitual. In which case, it is susceptible to the biases of "repetition" or "tradition,"
heuristics that frequently develop to reduce the costs of decisionmaking. Such constraints
on decisionmaking are "often quite rational in a global sense, because they permit us to
approximate utility-maximizing behavior at a reasonable cost .. " Korobkin & Ulen,
supra note 8, at 1114. However, such biases may continue to influence individual choice,
even when reliance on them would be "suboptimal," or even costly.
16 See W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social
Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 10-11 (2002) ("Rational-
choice theory predicts that the customer will leave without tipping; since she is a tourist,
she will suffer no reputational injuries as a result of stiffing the server .... ). The fact
that people actually do leave appropriate tips, even when the prospect for sanctions is
removed, suggests they are not acting purely in accordance with rational self-interest. Id.
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are unlikely ever to return-a behavior that the traditional, rational-choice
postulate of self-interested homo economicus can only regard as aberrantly
irrational. 17 The theory suggests that a social norm having an intrinsic utility
is likely to be maintained even when the repercussions for non-conformity
are attenuated, or even removed. 18 People have strong incentives to adapt
their practices to social norms. As long as some of a group's members
(though not necessarily all) regard a norm as sacrosanct, practice it, and
occasionally enforce it, others members will generally behave in ways that
uphold the norm.
This Note is premised on the idea that law and economics models of
mediation, which advocate predictive settlement, fail to take into
consideration relevant social norms. Like other law and economics theories,
they suffer the defect of being unduly instrumentalist. The appropriate
corrective entails more focus on the extra-legal incentives that influence the
parties' settlement choices. The subject of mediation is ripe for the
application of social norm theory. Greater appreciation for social norms can
enrich mediation practice. 19 Parties in mediation (and especially lawyers)
tend to invest considerable time and money into gaining better legal
understandings of their dispute without similarly attending to the social
norms that underlie the parties' relationship. They thus tend to overvalue the
costs of legal damages and undervalue the costs of normative sanctions.
Mediators who can correctly appraise these interests add value to the process
of mediation. Rather than viewing social norms merely as transaction costs,
17 Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Values and Institutions in Economic Analysis,
in ECONOMICS, VALUES, supra note 4, at 1, 18 (describing the traditional characteristics
attributed to the self-interested, rational actor, homo economicus).
18 While this may be true insofar as norms operate on individuals, a group's
dynamics can change very rapidly when the economic rationale for a social norm no
longer exists. Cooter, supra note 2, at 1654-55. As soon as western-style real estate
markets developed in Papua New Guinea, the indigenous Tolai people relinquished their
traditional custom of granting deference to local chiefs in matters of land distribution.
They feared that these chiefs might sell communal lands to outsiders. Id.
19 For instance, mediators seem to take greater cognizance of the social norms that
underlie most business relationships than do courts. A survey of in-house counsel, outside
counsel, and non-lawyer executives found that "the strongest correlates of belief in
mediation" for all groups were the "[perceptions] that mediation helps preserve business
relationships." John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives
Believe in Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 137, 214 (2000). Furthermore, the survey
found that "[r]espondents overwhelmingly [82%] believe that ADR is much more
sensitive to business concerns than the courts are." Id. at 186-87. For a discussion of the
social norms underlying business relationships, see POSNER, supra note 7, at 148-66.
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mediators should treat them as separate components of the dispute-as
"chips" that can be "traded off' against legal damages. 20
Under the right circumstances, mediation can add considerably more
value (both collectively and individually) than a court can, simply because
the process treats social norms as valid components of dispute resolution.
Two factors elevate the significance of social norms in mediation:
A. Early mediation: Mediating early-that is, before formal
discovery-not only saves transaction costs, but it also increases the
likelihood that the parties will honor efficient extra-legal social
norms. Additionally, it provides an opportunity for the parties to
discuss those norms, test them, and reject or alter them if need be.
B. Specialized knowledge: Where networks of relationships are
enduring, mediators who understand these networks will better
predict the likelihood of normative sanctions and appraise their
potential costs to the parties. Such specialized mediation forums are
particularly valuable whenever (1) a dispute takes place inside a
network of relationships having its own "institutional
infrastructure," 21 or else (2) the law governing the dispute is
transactional in nature.22 Employment, franchiser-franchisee, and
construction disputes are all excellent examples.
20 Certain social norms already play a crucial role in all settlement discussions,
whether mediated or not. Confidentiality agreements, for example, implicate the
"reputational capital" that is crucial to enforcing many social norms. Such agreements are
a classic defense against non-legal collective actions, such as gossip and ostracism.
Lawyers and mediators universally consider their value during settlement proceedings.
21 See Aviram, supra note 10, at 6 (Private legal systems "do not form
spontaneously but build on existing institutional infrastructure: networks that originally
facilitated low-enforcement-cost norms.").
22 Contract law, the principle vehicle for upholding transactional regimes,
effectively harnesses the power of the state to enforce the norms to which the parties have
obligated themselves. At least concerning the sale of durable goods, Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) (as supplemented by Article 1) enhances the state's
authority to enforce social norms. Those sections provide for additional gap-filling
measures like "reasonable commercial standards" (U.C.C. § 2-103(b)), and "course of
dealing and usage of trade" (U.C.C. § 1-205). As Lisa Bernstein has pointed out, Karl
Llewelyn, in his original drafts of Article 2, even envisioned the use of merchant juries to
determine such practices, a practice that hearkens back to the lex mercatoria of the
medieval period (discussed infra). See Lisa Bernstein, Formalism in Commercial Law:
The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2"s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary
Study, 66 U. CHi. L. REv. 710, 711 n.4 (1999) (citing National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Report and Second Draft: The Revised Uniform
Sales Act § 59(I)(a), (d), at 254 (1941)).
988
[Vol. 20:3 20051
MEDIATION AND SOCIAL NORMS
However, an awareness of relevant social norms may improve mediation
even if disputes are not especially likely to provoke social sanctions. Even
when relationships are coming to an end, the parties are contentious, or the
social network can only weakly police itself, the powerful residual effects of
social norms can still somewhat abate the effect of legal rules.
23
Part II of this Note argues that law and economic theories of mediation
have generally had a detrimental impact on mediation practice. By focusing
strictly on predictive settlement, these models are frequently at cross-
purposes with the broader goals of mediation. They fail to account for
empirical research into the negotiating habits of expert consumers of
mediation. Whereas most disputants use mediation on the eve of trial (when
legal information is greater), those who use mediation expertly are more
likely to use mediation before formal discovery has taken place (when
transaction costs are lower). They are also more likely to bring clients to
mediation. Not only do these habits reduce transaction costs, but they can
also improve mediation outcomes. At least in part, this improvement occurs
because of the parties' increased reliance on social norms.
Part III of this Note compares and contrasts two historical developments.
Social norm scholars, who generally advocate for "decentralized" social
enforcement, have generally regarded the Law Merchant (lex mercatoria)
that developed in medieval trading fairs as a paradigm example of social
norms informing and improving legal practice. From the 12th through the
17th centuries, this "natural law of merchants" was arbitrated inside quasi-
private courts called piepowder. These forums relied on actual merchant
practice to establish rules capable of facilitating an emerging commercial
order. Contemporary developments in the private resolution of construction
disputes show remarkable parallels to this medieval system. They offer a
modem example of how industry or social groups can cooperatively utilize
mediation to promote decentralized self-control over their own disputes.
Finally, this Note closes with some suggestions for further research. By
incorporating theories of social norms, the predictive settlement theory of
mediation can acquire greater analytic precision. More than simply a
theoretical corrective, however, an understanding of social norms can
actually improve mediation practice.
23 See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
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II. LAW AND ECONOMICS' PREDICTIVE SETTLEMENT MODEL: NEW
RESEARCH CASTS DOUBTS
A new generation of law and economics scholars has committed itself to
reconciling classical law and economics with a greater appreciation for extra-
legal influences on human behavior, especially the social incentives and
cognitive influences that inform and constrain individual choice. 24 Empirical
evidence and theoretical support from this field over the last decade suggests
that informal, decentralized methods of social control (i.e., social norms)
create incentives that are as powerful determinants of rational choice as are
legal rules.25
24 At least one of law and economics' "founders" has endorsed social norm theory
as an opportunity for greater economic precision and as a richer, more empirical
alternative to "academic moralizing." See Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 11; Richard
Posner, 1997 Oliver Wendal Holmes Lectures: The Problematics of Moral and Legal
Theory, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1641 (1998).
25 For examples of social norms that operate without state enforcement, see ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 73-87 (1984) (discussing the policy of
"Live and Let Live" during WWI trench warfare, in which enlisted soldiers on both sides
refused orders to fire at visible enemy combatants standing behind official lines); Marc
Ryser, Sanctions Without Law: The Japanese Financial Clearinghouse Guillotine and Its
Impact on Default Rates, in REPUTATION, supra note 4, at 225, 225-40 (discussing
Japanese banking clearinghouses that agree voluntarily to monitor bill and check
transactions and collectively suspend issuers of defaulted notes); Aviram, supra note 10,
at 3-4 (discussing the Pax Dei movement of the middle ages, by which feudal "warlords"
made solemn oaths to commoners that they would abide by rules of warfare for the
benefit of non-combatants); Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing
Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989); Posner &
Rasmusen, supra note 11, at 376-77 (discussing the Amish practice of "shunning," by
which members of the community ostracize norm-violators).
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A. Mediation as Predictive Settlement: Looking at Mediation Through
Instrumentalist Lenses
Mediation26 provides a fertile-and largely neglected 27-- opportunity to
further distinguish the classical law and economics movement from the
emerging one that incorporates social norms. 28 Consider that classical law
and economics treats mediation and other non-binding alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) processes mostly as predictive settlement devices. 29 One
26 Mediation is a form of ADR in which parties negotiate their dispute in the
presence of a neutral third party (the mediator). Unlike arbitrators, mediators are not
authorized to issue orders. Although most frequently used to settle pending litigation,
mediation can be quite effective in other contexts as well. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET
AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 111-12
(4th ed. 2003).
27 But see Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A
Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1997). Waldman advocates the view
that different bargaining contexts require very different approaches to social norms.
Waldman is among the very few mediation scholars who has consciously absorbed
sociological theories of social norms. She differentiates three approaches for applying
social norms in mediation: the "norm-generating" (Id. at 710-23), "norm-educating" (Id.
at 723-42), and "norm-advocating" (Id. at 742-56) approaches. Notably, Waldman's
tripartite model does not differentiate between legally enforced and extra-legal social
norms, but rather conflates them. Nor does she describe social norms in the rational
choice context as law and economics scholars have.
28 Alternatively, a substantial and growing literature exists on the relationship
between arbitration and social norms. Lisa Bernstein, for example, has studied
specialized commercial arbitration forums for cotton mill operators, grain distributors,
and diamond sellers. These forums resolve disputes (typically alleged contract breaches)
according to industry norms, rather than by resort to the official legal system. See,
respectively, Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724 (2001)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Cotton Industry]; Bernstein, supra note 22; Lisa Bernstein, Opting
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Diamond Industry].
29 See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-28 (1995). Shevell concedes that dispute resolution which is
"nonbinding" and "ex ante" (as, for example, mediation by prior agreement) can
"increase joint value" in a relationship between contracting parties (i.e., both are
enriched). But his model holds that a party will never take less than the probable legal
result (less transaction costs). In addition, he disregards the possibility that such parties
might generate creative, value-producing outcomes in "ex post" ADR. Id. at 5-6.
Similarly, applications of "decision analysis" to mediated settlement tend to treat the
process as a binary choice between outcomes in which "transaction costs" and court
"awards" are the crucial factors. See, e.g., Marjorie Corman Aaron & David P. Hoffer,
Decision Analysis as a Method of Evaluating the Trial Alternative, in MEDIATING LEGAL
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prominent economic model explains that "[t]he main reasons why ADR may
appeal jointly to parties ex post is that it may constitute a cheap substitute for
trial or that it may provide them with information about the trial outcome and
thus make settlement more likely." 30 According to this theory, all ex post
dispute resolution takes place under the shadow of predicted legal outcomes,
since "the plaintiff's relative optimism about winning-is what makes for
trial."'31 Therefore, if "the parties' beliefs are not too far apart, the savings in
trial costs will lead them to settle." 32 Otherwise, they will not settle.
Analytical models of dispute resolution produced by law and economics
scholars embody the presumption that parties' rational choice to settle entails
little more than predicting legal outcomes. 33 As informational asymmetries
about a case's likely outcome abate, rational parties will tend to move toward
settlement. The usefulness of mediation is little more than its predictive
value, defined as the difference between the parties' expectations of damages
after mediation minus the sum of their estimated trial expenses. 34
This economic model predicts that settlement negotiations will tend to
lead to the greatest expected returns for both parties. As one prominent
scholar put it, "parties will agree to settle if and only if that is superior to trial
for both."'35 Ultimately, though, what constitutes a "superior" settlement is
defined in a purely instrumentalist fashion. A typical formula defines
"superior" this way: If the net transaction costs are perceived to be greater
than the expected plaintiff award multiplied by the net value of all parties'
DIsPUTEs: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 307, 307-34 (Dwight
Golann ed., 1996); David P. Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Mediator's Tool, 1 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV., 113, 133 (1996).
Richard Posner has discussed ADR in the context of summary jury trials. Richard A.
Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986). Posner views such
techniques as only mildly beneficial for reducing court congestion and downright harmful
to those parties adamantly pursuing litigation. Sticklers for distinctions among dispute
resolution devices may object that summary jury trials share little in common with
mediation. But there is now considerable evidence that courts utilize both for roughly the
same ends. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Substituting Mediation for Arbitration: The
Growing Market for Evaluative Mediation, and What it Means for the ADR Field, 3 PEPP.
DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 111, 123 (2002).
30 Shavell, supra note 29, at 9.
31 Id. at 11.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 21-28.
3 4 Id. at 24.
35 Id. at 23.
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predictions about the trial's outcome, then settlement is rational. 36 So, for
example, a rational plaintiff will settle if he is offered $12,000 in lieu of a
trial where parties agree he has a 50% chance of winning $40,000 at a cost of
$10,000 for court and legal fees. Predicted value of trial is ($40,000 x 0.5) -
$10,000, or $10,000. Since $12,000 is greater than $10,000, not settling
would defy good sense.37
Of course, all this depends crucially on the mediation meeting "the laws
of conditional probability," 38 which requires that the mediation's actual
predictive value closely approximate the probability perceived by both
parties after engaging in it. 39 This value notably differs from the actual legal
outcome. 40 Yet, since people are not liable to be taken in so easily, only a
mediation that very nearly predicts the true value a court would distribute
(minus transaction costs) will convince well-informed parties to settle.41
Thus, a mediator adds value only if she can improve information about
probable trial outcome.
Despite its apparent ingenuity and elegance, the theory that mediation is
most rationally employed as a predictive settlement device is actually quite
3 6 Id. at 23.
37 The theory assumes that, rather than being high-stakes gamblers, parties will
generally avoid risk. Rather than seeking to maximize wealth, they will tend to maximize
"utility." In which case, "the first dollar one owns is [deemed] more valuable than the
second dollar, or the first $10,000 one owns is more valuable than the second $10,000,
etc." Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L.
REv. 113, 117-18 & n.13 (1996).
38 Shavell, supra note 29, at 22.
39 Id. at 22. But see supra notes 27, 31, and accompanying text.
40 Law and economics models of settlement negotiations do not accurately predict
settlement figures. On average, settlements are considerably lower than the theory would
predict. See Rachlinski, supra note 37, at 149-60 and accompanying notes (citing
empirical research showing that, on average, settlement offers were lower than those
predicted by law and economic models); see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud,
Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90
MICH. L. REv. 319, 354, 357, 369, 374-75 (1991) (showing lower than predicted
settlements for personal injury, vehicular negligence, consumer, and employment
disputes respectively). Rachlinski attributes this divergence to cognitive biases associated
with risk framing. He hypothesizes that defendants-because they wish to prevent
losses-tend to seek risk. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, seek to conserve gains, and so
they tend to be risk averse. Rachlinski, supra note 37, at 159-60. One alternative
hypothesis is that defendants (especially ones that are wealthy or subject to repeat
litigation) will seek to avoid reputations of being pushovers at the settlement table.
Because they consider settlement's possible long-term effect on their reputation, they
tend to view settlement as implicitly costly.
41 Shavell, supra note 29, at 23-27.
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deceptive. It follows directly from an inordinately instrumentalist conception
of rational choice, one that attributes maximal social efficiency to precise
conformity with legal rules. Adherents of the predictive settlement model
treat the law as the sword of Damocles hanging ominously over the whole
mediation process.
Of course, so long as one party considers its interest better served by
litigation, that party can leave the table or else threaten to leave, effectively
forcing other parties to make concessions or take their cases to court.42 But
when law and economics' scholars presume such behavior to be maximally
rational, they are engaging in rank positivism. The shadow of the law may be
long, but it is not unbounded; nor is it the only shadow hanging over
settlement.43
The notion that transaction costs44 are the only source of new value in
mediation, be it ex post or ex ante, suffers all the errors attributed to classical
law and economics by those in the movement who have taken notice of
social norms. The predictive theory of mediation exaggerates the effects of
legal incentives on the parties' choices, going so far as to treat them as the
only forces of real consequence. It implies that mediation is only useful if the
mediator, or at least the process itself, can signal to all disputants the same
legal outcome, though not necessarily the correct one. 45 The predictive
theory exaggerates the abilities of disputants46 and mediators47 to
42 As a statistical occurrence, the parties' "day in court" will almost certainly be
elusive. Only 2.9% of state cases and 5.0% of federal cases (excluding asbestos claims)
ever get to litigation. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal
Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 433, 442-45 (1996). More often,
abortive mediation means later settlement negotiations. To some lawyers, this very
situation begs the question of what a mediator is good for. After all, most lawyers and
even many clients are capable negotiators. According to Robert Baruch Bush, the
presence of a neutral party lowers the strategic and cognitive barriers to effective
negotiation. Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediator For? ": Mediation's
"Value-Added"for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 8-14 (1996).
43 Lande, supra note 19, at 152 & n.49.
44 The term "transaction costs" could denote a sophisticated analysis of the
economic consequences of settlement versus trial ("What are the economic consequences
of a diminished reputation?," "If my ex-wife and I are not sociable in the future, what
costs will that entail?," etc.). However, the law and economics literature typically treats
transaction costs as mere shorthand for "court costs."
45 While the theory does not actually propose that the mediator can predict the
correct trial outcome, it casts doubt on the usefulness of any mediation that does not
move the parties towards similar estimates of trial outcome. Shavell, supra note 29, at
18-19,28.
46 Empirical evidence suggests that people grossly misevaluate and/or misapply
even those legal rules that affect them personally, and do not make a diligent effort to
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meaningfully evaluate legal rules. It devalues social context and ignores the
social roles of the disputing parties, implying that the inclusion of such
factors in their settlement calculations defies logic.48
identify those rules before making decisions with legal consequences. Stewart Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: a Preliminary Study, in FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND CONTRACTS: A READER IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 339, 344-47 (Peter J.
Buckley & Jonathan Michie eds., 1996) (explaining that even such presumably in-the-
know actors as American businesspeople frequently sign contracts without any useful
comprehension of their legal consequences); H. LAURENCE Ross, SET-LED OUT OF
COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 122-34 (rev. ed.
1980) (stating that insurance adjusters usually grant awards to the seriously injured even
when their claims have no legal merit; they also apply comparative negligence principles
in jurisdictions where contributory negligence constitutes a complete defense); Pauline T.
Kim, Norms, Learning, and the Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers' Legal
Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 447 (1999) (noting that workers in California, New
York, and Missouri misunderstand their states' default rules of employment at will and
therefore consistently overestimate their legal rights). Furthermore, no matter what their
legal knowledge, disputants frequently succumb to the "overconfidence bias," seeing
their side of the dispute in the best possible light. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral
Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1653, 1659 & n.22
(1998) (noting that nearly 200 articles indicate the frequency of such biases).
In addition, clients, who depend on attorneys to correctly evaluate mediation's
predicted value, frequently overestimate their counsels' legal knowledge. See Chris
Guthrie, The Lawyer's Philosophical Map and the Disputant's Perceptual Map:
Impediments to Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 145,
166-67 (2001).
47 Anyone who wonders how mediators actually "predict" legal outcomes should
consider the mediated settlement that was litigated in Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945,
946-47 (S.D. Tex. 1998). After their minor son was shot by a Bellair, Texas, police
officer, the Allens entered mediated negotiations with the city's attorney. They later
charged that the mediator had used intimidation to force the Allens' to accept a cash
settlement of $90,000. Id. For an eye-opening discussion of the case, see Nancy A.
Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court Connected Mediation: The
Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 9-13 (2001).
Lawyers frequently allege that mediators (including retired judges) do not
adequately research the law before making evaluative predictions. See Anne S. Kim,
Rent-a-Judges and the Cost of Selling Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 166, 175-78 & n. 89 (1994);
James J. Alfmi, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing it Out: Is This the End of "Good
Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U.L REv. 47, 66, 69-71 & n. 95 (1991).
48 Richard H. Weise, who "mainstreamed" the use of ADR at the Motorola
Corporation has described law and economics' "decision-tree" analysis as "just the
beginning" of ADR economics. He argues that the real key is educating outside counsel
about the economic value of the business practices of the client. "While the client wants
to stop the cash bleeding, resume valuable relationships with customers, suppliers, and
governments and cap monumental exposures, outside counsel continues to employ every
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Precisely as it elevates the role of the law, the theory debases the parties'
ordinary reliance on normative standards (social norms) to appraise the
"meaning" of the dispute. It predicts that the parties' alternatives to a
negotiated agreement49 will include various permutations of legal outcomes
from which they may deduct the increasingly greater transaction costs
necessary to achieve such results. However, these calculations too frequently
neglect any of the non-legal sanctions or valuations that clients might
otherwise consider relevant.50 What is worse, some consumers and
practitioners of mediation have absorbed this theory,51 and treat it as a
available associate to turn over every rock on the path to the courthouse." Richard H.
Weise, Taking Charge, DisP. REsOL. MAG., Summer 2000, at 12, 13-14.
4 9 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETrING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOuT GIVING IN 99-106 (Bruce Patton ed. 2d ed. 1991).
50 Consider, for example, the non-legal sanctions that follow a breach in a
commercial contract relationship. The breaching party may sustain damage to his
reputation-a sanction that, depending on the size and anonymity of the market, can
range from negligible to fatal. A second type of non-legal sanction is the divestiture of a
disputant's own perception of his or her self-worth. Even if a court reduces or eliminates
legal culpability, breaching parties may still regard themselves as less competent or
trustworthy. See Ben-Ner & Putterman, in ECONOMICS, VALUEs, supra note 17, at 18
(explaining that economists are prone to undervalue the cost of non-rational, internalized
sanctions like guilt). But see POSNER, supra note 7, at 43-44 (arguing that psychological
theories of guilt are undeveloped and cannot accurately predict behavior).
Beyond sanctions which merely harm a party's reputation or business prospects are
actual material sanctions. Consider that a non-breaching party will sometimes remain in
possession of some valuable relationship-specific asset (a bond) that once belonged to the
breaching party. Some familiar examples are a franchisor's ability render a franchisee's
investment worthless by revoking their privileged use of a trademark, an investor
stopping a line of credit after a shareholder dispute, and termination of an uncompleted
construction contract by a known expert (suggesting loss of both material and
reputational bonds). Chamy, supra note 4, at 392-97. All of these kinds of sanctions may
be ameliorated or eliminated by a successful mediation, but doing so requires the parties
to attend to these issues while bargaining.
51 Mediators have increasingly joined lawyers in endorsing mediation as a predictive
settlement device. Bush, supra note 29, at 114. Mediators who engage in predictive
settlement may resort to strong-arming. For example, they may "trash" the parties' legal
arguments until the disputants "put 'realistic' settlement figures on the table," or else
"bash" those offers until both sides can agree. Alfini, supra note 47, at 69-71 (citing
interviews conducted with lawyers and mediators). Although Alfini found lawyers in his
study who endorse such practices, even some who complained that certain mediators are
"not pushy enough," other lawyers regard these tactics as contrary to the best interest of
the parties. Id. at 70-71.
Stipanowich cites as a warning the behavior of one mediator who was also a
practicing construction attorney. Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Multi-Door Contract and
Other Possibilities, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 303, 371-72 (1998). Engineers at a
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bastion of realism in a field that allegedly tilts towards the "mushy" and the
transcendent.
B. Response by the Mediation Movement
For quite some time now, mediation scholars have lamented attempts to
reduce mediation to a predictive settlement device.52 They raise concerns that
the perception of mediation as a substitute for adjudication diminishes
parties' opportunities to maximize social utility for their full array of
interests. Most agree that parties who enter mediation in pursuit of predictive
settlement reduce their likelihood of gaining the most value from the process.
However, no one has yet demonstrated in a thoroughly coherent way how
predictive settlement has this effect; or, more importantly, how it might be
otherwise. What is more, even the fiercest critics of predictive settlement
admit that such practices are currently in wide demand.53 Judges, most of
whom support ADR devices as palliatives for court congestion, have viewed
with skepticism the claims of mediators that the process can produce
outcomes that deviate from legal rules. 54
An analytical model of mediation that fully incorporates the economics
of social norms would go a long way towards improving the blunt, predictive
"leading architectural engineering (A/E) firm" procured his services in the interest of
strengthening relations with a major contractor with whom they were in dispute.
Although the engineers believed the relationship reparable, the mediator actually
frustrated this goal. "To the client's horror, no opportunity existed to enter into mutual
discussion or seek a consensus of any kind--only a 'shuttlecock dickering' over dollars."
Id.
52 In 1991, the Florida State University Law Review published a series of important
articles in a symposium issue addressing the downside of using mediation as a predictive
settlement device. See Alfini, supra note 47; Craig A McEwen, Pursuing Problem-
Solving or Predictive Settlement?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 77 (1991); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or
"The Law ofADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991).
53 Among the earliest, and rightly famous, of these critics is Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, who has described mediation as a history of "legal innovation co-opted," or "an
ironic tale of the unintended consequences of social change and legal reform." Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 52, at 1. For more recent criticism, see Welsh, supra note 47, at 4-5,
23-27, and Bush, supra note 29, at 111-14. Bush has approached these practices with an
attitude of "if you can't beat them, regulate them." Bush, supra note 29, at nn.39-42 and
accompanying text. According to him, mediation that aims at predictive settlement
should be recognized as the practice of law, and strictly reserved for lawyers. Id. at 372.
54 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Many Doors, Closing Doors: Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 211, 254 n.172, 265 n.217,
and accompanying text (1995).
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settlement model. A fully realized model would have a variety of benefits.
First, it would expand law and economics' predictive-settlement model by
identifying and assigning values 55 to extra-legal incentives that additionally
influence disputants' choice to settle. In addition, it would, provide a
methodology for mediation design and mediator practice that incorporates
evaluative, problem-solving, and transformative tools in an appropriate way,
rather than simply an ideological way.56 Perhaps most importantly, it would
identify the conditions under which mediation might help cohesive blocks of
cooperators to maintain and even maximize net benefits within the group, a
phenomenon that Robert Cooter aptly terms the "utilitarianism of small
groups."57
Evidence from industry-specific arbitration systems already indicates
that intra-group commitment to ADR can maintain utility-maximizing group
55 The assignments of quantitative value to reputational capital or social norms may
strike some as merely arbitrary. But it is really no less so than the practice of assigning
unscientific probability (p) values to parties' chances of winning at trial. See Shavell,
supra note 29, at 22; cf. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 26, at 356 (asking whether decision
analysis is a "somewhat refined and attenuated example of 'garbage in, garbage out"').
Consider too that juries may be called on to assess the loss of reputation in dollar values
and that constitutional plaintiffs frequently spend profusely in order to establish new
social norms. See Charles Lane, An Allegiance to Dissent: Man's Challenge to "Under
God" is One of Many, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2003, at Al (describing the pursuit by
activist Michael Newdow, an attorney and medical doctor, to remove "under God" from
the Pledge of Allegiance; Newdow, who has "all but ceased working," tells reporters, "I
had $3 million, but I'm going to end up bankrupt.").
56 Even in the tentative form produced here, this model generally supports
facilitative methods of mediation but with the caveat that facilitation will necessarily be
less effective for some disputes than for others. It also predicts that creative problem
solving becomes increasingly difficult as the dispute nears trial, mostly because parties
have invested in a legal frame to the detriment of other kinds of frames. In general, it is
probably true that opportunities for genuine transformation via mediation are likely to be
rare, but not so extraordinary as to foreclose mediators' interest in this possibility. To
borrow terms from Sunstein, transformative mediation is an opportunity for "norm
entrepreneurs" (among disputants or even mediators) to expend reputational capital (and
probably even real capital) in the hopes of convincing others to adopt, or at least consider
the adoption of new social norms ("norm cascades"). Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2029-33 (1996).
57 Robert D. Cooter, Law From Order: Economic Development and the
Jurisprudence of Social Norms, in A NOT-SO-DISMAL SCIENCE: A BROADER VIEW OF
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETIES 228, 229-30 (Mancur Olson & Satu Kiihkonen eds., 2000)
(explaining "the tendency of small groups to develop efficient rules for cooperation
among members").
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norms that deviate somewhat from legal rules.58 While evidence suggests
that social norms operate in large, anonymous groups as well as tightly knit
ones, 59 there is good reason to believe that disputants belonging to the latter
can maximize the utility of social norms in ways that the former cannot. 60
The increasing prominence of mediation relative to arbitration in the
ADR universe need not be an occasion for despair over lost ideals. 61 If
changes in the market for ADR suggest anything at all, it is that consumers of
mediation are not all alike. Thus, there is no need for all mediators to be
alike. Mediators, like other producers of services, can increase their
marketability by providing more value. Doing this requires that they partner
with ADR consumers, inform them, and also become informed by them.62
This last notion is crucial because, for social norms to be utilized
appropriately, the mediator must understand those norms well enough to
identify their impact on the mediating parties.
C. Focus on Consumers (Disputants and Their Lawyers), Not
Producers (Mediators)
Over the past two decades, mediation has undergone dramatic growth.
While the market for ADR has grown generally, use of mediation seems to
58 According to Bernstein, tightly knit commercial collectives have already utilized
binding arbitration in this way. See Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra note 28, at 1732
(noting that, although the cotton industry's "[t]rading [r]ules would be enforceable under
the [Uniform Commercial] Code if included in a contract, they nonetheless differ from
the Code in fundamental ways"); Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra note 28, at 149
(explaining that because diamond arbitrators "possess industry expertise" and "are
permitted to consider information that would be excluded in court under the rules of
evidence," some kinds of disputes typically result in verdicts that are "more accurate and
predictable than those of a court"). Under appropriate conditions, the maintenance and
evolution of extra-legal industry norms can operate via the mediation market as well. All
that is required is reciprocal cooperation among "repeat-players" (typically, but not
necessarily, through contract), appropriate signaling by mediators (via advertising,
credentialing, etc.), and a generally "hands-off' approach by judges who must decide
whether to enforce these commitments. For a discussion that such a movement within the
mediation market is already underway, see Bush, supra note 29, at 127-31 and Bryant G.
Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented
Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 927, 937-49 (2002).
59 See, e.g., April Mara Major, Norm Origin and Development in Cyberspace:
Models of Cybernorm Evolution, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 75-95 (2000); Strahilevitz, supra
note 10, at 361-65.
60 Generally, the larger and more anonymous a social group, the more incentives
there are for members to opportunistically violate social norms.
61 See Bush, supra note 29, at 118-24. But see id. at 128-31.
62 Id. at 128-30.
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have outpaced the use for other forms of ADR such as arbitration.63 Despite
its expansion, mediation has yet to produce a fully coherent theoretical
framework to explain how mediator intervention benefits the disputing
parties.64 Most theories of mediation place considerable attention on the role
of the mediator. 65 Generally, theories of mediation attribute considerable
importance to the mediator's style or approach. Perhaps this is because the
mediator is the one party over whom scholars and educators feel they have
any influence.
It is time to consider whether this traditional focus on the mediator is a
flawed approach. Such a focus is unhelpful for understanding the shift
towards predictive settlement, and perhaps even for improving mediation
quality generally. The social norm model proposed here focuses instead on
the cognitive framework that the parties use to identify and evaluate their
interests. If market forces are driving the trend towards predictive settlement,
then scholars should look to mediation's consumers-not its ostensible
suppliers-to understand this shift. 66
The value parties place on information is key. The greater the parties'
investment in obtaining a strictly legal analysis of their dispute, the less
likely they are to capture mediation's unique, extra-legal benefits. Very
simply, parties who have invested considerable time, effort, or money in
ascertaining a legal opinion of their dispute will generally seek to capitalize
on that information. They will tend to ignore their non-legal interests, and
eschew resolutions that do not conform to perceived legal outcomes. They
will likely wonder about any mediator who wishes to direct them towards
larger issues, and will gravitate instead towards mediators who try to predict
legal outcomes and offer "realistic" numbers.
63 See Thomas R. Donahue & Barbara C. Deinhardt, Survey: ADR Use Increasing,
15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LrIG. 66 (1997) (stating that of the corporations
surveyed, 87% report using mediation over a three-year period compared to 78% using
arbitration over the same period); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration:
Innovation and Evolution in the United States Construction Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 65, 140-41 (1996).
64 For a discussion, see Dorothy Della Noce et al., Clarifying the Theoretical
Underpinnings of Mediation: Implications for Practice and Policy, 3 PEPP. DisP. RESOL.
L.J. 39, 39-65 (2002). The authors concede that "mediation practice has developed,
largely in the absence of articulated, scholarly, theoretical frameworks explaining
mediation as a distinct social process ... " Id. at 42.
65 An indication that this focus is misplaced is suggested by GOLDBERG ET AL.,
supra note 26, at 161. "Of the measured traits of mediators, only experience (having
mediated more than 15 cases) even approache[s] a statistically significant relationship
with settlement." Id.
66 See Bush, supra note 29, at 118-24. But see id. at 128-31.
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Contrary to various ideologies, the mediator's role is actually pretty
sparse. As professional neutrals, mediators tend to adjust their practices to
reflect the desires of the parties. Most are trained to help resolve disputes
according to the interests of the disputing parties.67 Typically, as interest-
based bargaining replaces the haggler's dickering over margins, opportunities
for mutual gain are increased. 68 Mediators learn that, in order to understand
parties' interests, they should focus on the parties' personal goals and
aspirations. However, a problem arises. Once a party has invested in a strictly
legal analysis of their dispute, often their personal goal and aspiration is, very
simply, to "win." That party's perception of the dispute becomes adapted to
the adversarial, zero-sum approach of formal adjudication. 69  Such
perceptions are likely to be exacerbated by contact with attorneys whose
"philosophical maps" are oriented towards the adversarial70 as epitomized by
the professional ideal of zealous advocacy. 71
It is difficult to estimate just how costly the lawyer's "adversarial
orientation" is for clients. But a recent study of six in-house and major
corporate counsels indicates that lawyers' attitudes considerably i,,pact the
quality of mediation, as defined by real costs to their respective corporate
clients. 72 This should come as no surprise, since most often it is lawyers, not
disputants or mediators, who are the proximate gatekeepers to mediation.
67 Kathy Kirk, Mediation Training: What's the Point, Are the Tricks Really New,
and Can an OldDog Learn?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 637, 645-48, 650 (1998). Kirk endorses
the view that "mediation is neither a science nor pure instinct, but a teachable set of
skills." Id. at 650. According to her, the most important feature of mediation training is
the promulgation of the concept of interest-based bargaining. The wholesale application
of interest-based negotiation theory to mediation has not been without critics, however.
See Della Noce et al., supra note 64, at 44-45.
68 FISHER & URY, supra note 49, at 40-55. Interest-based bargaining entails parties
exploring each other's interests rather than merely taking a hard bargaining position over
some single quantifiable factor (e.g., land, money, "the pie"). By using this approach,
parties are more likely to turn their dispute into a collaborative effort for achieving
mutual gain, or "win-win" results.
69 Jonathan M. Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of Negotiation: Can Good
Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L. REv. 863, 863-76 (1987) (analyzing
various traits of litigating attorneys that conflict with facets of fruitful negotiations);
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 52, at 2-3, 17.
70 Guthrie, supra note 46, at 160-64 (citing empirical research that suggests lawyers
are "disproportionately oriented to an adversarial worldview").
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2002).
72 Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of
Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 831, 839-47 & n.46 (1998); see also infra note 76 and accompanying text.
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The study suggests that changing attorneys' attitudes towards mediation,
especially their sense of when to mediate, might go a long way toward
improving the quality of mediated settlements.
The research focused on large corporate consumers of mediation. Of the
six corporate counsels studied, five were signatories to the corporate pledge
of the Center for Public Resources' Institute for Dispute Resolution (CPR).73
The researchers found that, despite this professed commitment to ADR, only
two of the corporations used mediation with enough frequency (30% and
40% of the time, respectively) to enjoy substantial cost-reduction benefits. 74
And, of these two, only one75 used it early enough to preempt discovery
proceedings-arguably the main culprit of the "transaction costs" that
predictive settlement theories seek to reduce. 76 This company settled its
business-to-business cases an average of ten months earlier77 and reported
the strongest levels of partnership between attorneys and business
executives. 78
The suggestion that mediated settlement negotiations should occur before
discovery is contrary to many lawyers' professional practice. 79 So entrenched
is the lawyer's interest in having all the facts that it may be described with
73 Id. at 841. For a complete list of signatories to the CPR pledge, see CPR
CORPORATE POLICY STATEMENT ON ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION REGISTRY OF
SUBSCRIBERS (CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, 2003), available at
http://dyn.cpradr.org/corppldg.asp (last visited February 14, 2005).
74 Rogers & McEwen, supra note 72, at 840 & 843 n.71 and accompanying text; see
also John Lande, Relationships Drive Support for Mediation, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 95, 96-97 (1997) (arguing that time and costs are interwoven issues of
outcome quality).
75 See Rogers & McEwen, supra note 72, at 842. This most expert consumer of
mediation was the Motorola Corporation. Interview with Nancy H. Rogers, study co-
author, in Columbus, Ohio (Mar. 1, 2004); see also supra note 49.
76 See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 505, 508-523 (2000); John Burritt McArthur, The Strange Case of American Civil
Procedure and the Missing Uniform Discovery Time Limits, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 865,
n.76 (1996); see also INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, 143 F.R.D. 371, 387 (1991) (Many lawyers and judges believe that
discovery is increasingly used "as a weapon rather than as an information gathering
mechanism.").
77 Rogers & McEwen, supra note 72, at 843 n.71 and accompanying text.
78 Id. at 844-45.
79 Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms
Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1311-12 (1998)
(noting that in both the Federal and state courts, discovery is not ordinarily stayed when a
case is diverted from the trial docket to mediation).
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some certainty as a social norm unto itself.80 Like most social norms, it has
proved virtually adamantine for reformers. 81 Yet, for those willing to risk
bucking trends, a policy of mediating early can bring major advantages.
This early research suggests that the willingness to negotiate early, with
levels of information that other counsel would deem inadequate,82 resulted in
positive snowball effects for that corporation. Three benefits in particular
stand out. First, this company settled disputes an average of ten months
earlier than the four corporations who used mediation least frequently, and
eight months earlier than the next largest consumer of mediation.83 Second,
lawyers in this company reported that they found mediation a positive
alternative to formal discovery.84 Third, these counsel favored client
attendance at mediation in 60% of their cases (compared to 27%
elsewhere).85 Each of these practices contributed to better mediation
outcomes for the company, measured not only in cost savings, but also in
better business relationships. Yet each decreased the availability of legal
information, forcing disputants' to rely less on that kind of information and
more on other kinds. Might there be a connection between these two factors?
Could it be that attorneys' openness to mediating without complete legal
information-and even going so far as to bring their clients to settlement
negotiations--could result in benefits for a major corporate client?
80 Cooter, supra note 2, at 1647. Professionals like lawyers and accountants
frequently self-regulate according to profession-wide norms.
81 Rogers & McEwen, supra note 72, at 842. One attorney interviewee told
researchers that "the use of discovery will never diminish because it's tradition." Another
(general counsel to the 40% company) reported that he finally got the legal department to
consider mediation by instituting a protocol that made it prohibitively difficult for staff to
proceed with formal discovery. Id. at 843. To initiate discovery, attorneys would have to
fill out an internal request that was "like an IRS form" in size and complexity. Id.;
Interview with Nancy H. Rogers, supra note 75.
82 Rogers & McEwen, supra note 72, at 843. This company's general counsel told
researchers that "[a]ttorneys want 100 percent of the information before advising
settlement. CEOs make decisions involving as much money based on [only] 30 percent of
the information." To that end, he recommended lawyers putting themselves on "a diet
concerning our information needs."
83 Id. at 843 & n.71.
84 Id. at 843.
85 Id. at 844.
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D. Kinds of Interests-What Instrumentalism Overlooks
One explanation for why early negotiation improves settlement outcomes
focuses entirely on savings in transaction costs. 86 An indication that this
appraisal may be unduly restrictive is its inability to account for the choices
made by lawyers who mediate early. The corporate survey found that such
lawyers enthusiastically "[emphasize] in place of formal discovery both
informal investigation and the exchange of information that can occur as part
of the mediation process." 87 Furthermore, these lawyers' increased
willingness to bring clients to negotiations indicates their belief that their
clients' non-legal (normative) frameworks actually add value to the
process-a belief that the predictive settlement model simply cannot account
for.88
A more provocative view is that, once placed on a restrictive "diet" of
legal information, lawyers' adversarial framework declines, permitting other
interests to frame the negotiation. To borrow the language of principled
negotiation, parties recognize that the "objective criteria" 89 used to
meaningfully evaluate their dispute need not be limited to legal rules.
Informal sharing of information may sometimes be more pertinent to
settlement negotiations than "turning over every rock" to find the ideal legal
theory. 90
Expert consumers of mediation recognize that the parties' interests
frequently include a broader consideration of the social consequences of their
dispute.91 Generally, the personal implicates the social, and vice versa.
86 See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and the New Market for Disputes: A
Framework for Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12 STuD. IN L. POL. & SOC'Y
367, 369 (1992) (The primary effect of ADR devices is to "promote relatively quick
settlements so that the costs of discovery are limited.").
87 Rogers & McEwen, supra note 72, at 843.
88 After all, if informational asymmetries about legal outcome are the sole deterrents
to settlement, the presence of non-expert clients will not likely improve the negotiations.
89 FISHER & URY, supra note 49, at 81-92. The authors list a variety of bases on
which to form "objective criteria" including legal precedent, but also market value,
scientific judgment, efficiency, moral standards, tradition, and reciprocity. Id. at 85. The
authors implicitly recognize that disputes with legal consequences may nevertheless be
analyzed according to non-legal objective criteria.
90 See Weise, supra note 48.
91 FISHER & URY, supra note 49, at 46-48. Fisher and Ury recommend that
bargaining parties create a "checklist of consequences" to help them identify their
interests. Id. at 46. Of primary consequence is the impact on the bargaining party's own
personal interests. However, bargaining decisions also reflect an "[i]mpact on the group's
interests." Id. at 47. Bargaining parties ignore these broader, social interests at their peril.
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Mediators can gain a better appreciation of mediation's social consequences
by considering them analytically. 92 Greater awareness of how social forces
interact with individuals' personal interests will afford mediators more
opportunities to recognize-and even to inform93-the parties' perceptions
of their own interests. The theory of social norms provides a useful tool for
understanding why parties rely on socially accepted standards of fairness and
efficiency when bargaining.
When parties settle disputes in mediation, legal interpretations of their
behavior are liable to be less meaningful than they would be in a formal
adjudication. 94 Parties will typically rely on other objective criteria to
evaluate their interests. As the importance of legal norms recedes, parties to
mediation are increasingly likely to evaluate their own interests, as well as
the other parties' interests, according to social norms. By limiting formal
discovery and by bringing clients to mediation, bargainers increase the
relevance of extra-legal "frames." 95
While mediation scholars idealistically emphasize the parties having the
individual autonomy to make their own bargaining choices, people typically
The theory developed in this Note is that the social consequences of a mediated
settlement considerably impact the parties' "personal" interests. Fisher and Ury
recognized this interaction between the personal and the social. Tellingly, in their chosen
example, the personal interests of the bargainer ("Will I lose or gain political support?";
"Will colleagues criticize or praise me?") implicate social consequences of their
bargaining choices. Id.
92 This treatment conforms to the recommendations by Fisher and Ury: "The more
you bring standards of fairness, efficiency, or scientific merit to bear on your particular
problem, the more likely you are to produce a final package that is wise and fair." Id. at
83.
93 See Waldman, supra note 27, at 723-42 (discussing a "norm-educating model" of
mediation in which the mediator informs parties about applicable social (and legal)
norms, but does not challenge parties who choose to deviate from these norms by mutual,
informed agreement).
94 As one of John Lande's interviewees (an inside counsel) reported:
[Trying ADR] just makes a heck of a lot more sense. If you can resolve it face to
face, sitting down just talking, businesspeople to businesspeople, you don't even
have to have lawyers in the room .... I mean it's somebody to make people think
about the consequences before they charge off the cliff.... You don't have all
those legal fees. And you probably come out with a better answer anyway. Litigated
answers usually aren't very good.
Lande, supra note 19, at 185 (alteration in original).
95 FISHER & URY, supra note 49, at 88. Issues should be framed as a "joint search for
objective criteria" with parties remaining "open to reason as to which standards are the
most appropriate." Id. This implies that a strictly legal frame, while relevant, need not
preclude other "frames" that the parties might wish to emphasize.
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look for assurance that their interests conform to socially sanctioned
behavior. The fact that individual choices frequently adhere to perceived
social norms partly explains the mutual support for ADR by both "neo-
liberal" defenders of individual autonomy as well as by those who endorse a
"communitarian" ethos of facilitation.96
The cognitive tools that parties use to evaluate their interests are likely to
encompass each of the following:
(1) Legal norms, which are related to the parties' expectations of a
disputes' outcome at trial.
(2) Social norms, which are related to the parties' expectations of the
social sanctions they may incur or avoid depending on whether the
mediation is successful or abortive. 97
(3) Personal interests, which are related to parties' own perceptions of
their autonomous preferences and needs.
These categories are not discrete. 98 For example, there may be
considerable overlap between the legal and social consequences of an
abortive mediation. The person who has reason to fear the legal
repercussions of going to court may be equally mindful of possible long-term
costs to his reputation. Likewise, the bargainer who hopes to repair a
business relationship by successful mediation may have considerable
personal interests at stake. The divorc6 who wants to amicably dissolve a
marriage may be acting in accordance with the social expectations of an
extended family that punishes nonconformity to its values with gossip and
ostracism. Sometimes, the personal interest is nothing more than a desire for
96 Leon E. Trakman, Commentary: Appropriate Conflict Management, 2001 Wis. L.
REv. 919, 920-22 (2001). Trakman defines ADR as appropriate conflict management.
According to Trakman, "Conflict management is grounded in competing philosophies."
Id. at 920. But while these philosophies may evidence ideological disagreement,
"[i]ndividuated and communitarian methods of conflict management often co-exist." Id.
at 921. Furthermore, "A viable philosophical conception of ADR ordinarily engages both
liberal and communitarian ends." Id. at 922.
97 "Social norms" and "personal interests" frequently overlap. As Trakman has
pointed out, social values may be divided between two sets. The first set encompasses
values that the individual voluntarily subscribes to, while the other set includes all of the
values that others attribute to them and to which they expect or require conformity. Id. at
922.
98 Id. at 924-25. Communal values and individual ends encompass a range, and are
"mutually supportable." A bargainer may be part of an industry that values "profit
maximization" in which case that party will have a personal interest in maintaining low
transaction costs. Id. at 925. Vice versa, an "[i]ndividual interest in vengeance, an
apology, or compensation are all sustainable under communal conceptions of social
justice." Id.
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the other party to recognize the legitimacy of a social norm-for example, by
making apologies.99
III. SOCIAL NORMS IN ACTION: FROM THE LAW MERCHANT TO THE
MEDIATION OF CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS
The history of commercial law may be viewed as a continuous series of
thrusts and parries between the business community and the state, each
pursuing a timeless search for equilibrium between centralized regulation and
decentralized self-ordering. 100 Over the course of this history, instances of
99 See Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yam, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH.
L. REv. 1121, 1136 (2002) (treating apology as means to signal recognition of shared
social norms); see also Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1009, 1016, 1020-21 (1999) (defining apology as a "commodity" on which the
wrongdoer holds a monopoly, and arguing that such a holder may trade for tangible value
in certain settlement negotiations); Donna L. Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse
and Carriage of the Twenty-First Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 829, 857-58
(2003) (specifying mediation as the most likely forum in which disputants can effectively
utilize the apology). According to O'Hara and Yarn:
Identification of the wrongful act, remorse, and promise to forbear are elements that
confirm the validity of a norm shared by the victim and transgressor. Through a
clear expression of these elements, the transgressor displays recognition of the norm
violated and acceptance of the mutuality of that norm.... Conversely, if interacting
parties have failed to establish shared social norms prior to an alleged transgression,
the apology can be delayed pending discussion of appropriate standards of conduct.
O'Hara & Yam, supra, at 1136 (emphasis added).
100 See BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW, JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE
43-83 (1991) (discussing the history of law as the increased centralization of
"authoritarian law"). For a general history of the relationship between governments and
markets in the 20th Century, see DANIEL YERGIN, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS (1998).
According to Yergin, trends since the end of the Cold War indicate greater deregulation
of markets. Id. at 266-399; see also Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance
Project: The Duty to Care and the Business Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 BUS.
LAW. 1237, 1238-42 (1986) ("The foundation stone of the American law of corporate
governance" is the business judgment rule, which holds that "there must be a minimum
of interference by the courts in internal corporate affairs."). But see Robert C. Ellickson,
Taming Leviathan: Will the Centralizing Tide of the Twentieth Century Continue into the
Twenty-First?, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 101, 104-112 (2000) (arguing that the 20th century
witnessed a monumental growth in regulation by governments as indicated by increases
in the number of public laws, court suits, legal professionals, public-sector employment,
and land-use regulations); Symposium, International Accounting Standards in the Wake
of Enron, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725, 935 (2003). This symposium generally
indicated that centralized regulation is once again expanding in the U.S. and abroad, as
exemplified by the recent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. Recent changes may
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private dispute resolution have played a central role, appearing, disappearing,
and reappearing sporadically. Forums for private self-regulation have
frequently risked strain with the official courts01 and have faced public
concerns over risks of opportunism 10 2 and the inadequacies of private
resolutions. 103
Nevertheless, parties that interact long enough frequently establish their
own social norms, as well as self-help measures designed to enforce those
norms. Even when those relationships are sealed by formal contract (as in a
business relationship), the parties rarely make explicit all relevant social
norms. There are simply too many contingencies to anticipate all the
potential defections by which each party might appropriate value from the
other.104 When public courts must adjudicate alleged breaches, they
frequently do so at considerable distance from the parties' actual business
environment. 10 5 What is more, the parties will each tend to overstate
whatever information will most likely yield its preferred legal outcome.
This section compares two discrete episodes of this history, stretching
from the very beginnings of the common law to the law's evolving present.
First, an outline of the medieval Law Merchant (lex mercatoria) is offered.
Operating initially within quasi-private tribunals known as piepowder, 10 6 this
be signaling a new era of increased regulatory standards by states over corporations, and
the accounting and legal professions that serve them. Participants debated the
welcomeness of these changes and their implications. Symposium, supra, at 935
101 MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860,
at 145-49 (1977). In the early nineteenth century, American merchants relied on private
arbitration and resisted legal centralization. That merchant disputes ultimately came
under the purview of centralized public institutions was mainly due to the efforts of an
"increasingly organized and self-conscious legal profession." Id. at 154; see also Bruce
H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American
Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443 (1984); Eben Moglen, Note, Commercial Arbitration
in the Eighteenth Century: Searching for the Transformation of American Law, 93 YALE
L.J. 135 (1983).
102 See Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L. REv. 1179, 1188
(2003) (describing highly regulatory antitrust and consumer protection laws as
correctives to "information asymmetries that make opportunistic behavior more likely").
103 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984).
104 See POSNER, supra note 7, at 152.
105 Aviram has pointed out that courts are "usually the most distant from the norm
violator" and therefore have "significant monitoring costs and costs of error." Aviram,
supra note 102, at 1188-89.
106 While in later centuries the Courts of Chancery and even the King's Bench
would also apply rules understood to constitute the Law Merchant (see W. MITCHELL,
THE LAW MERCHANT 39 (1904)), the fair courts (piepowder) actually bear the closest
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"natural law of merchants" governed commercial disputes from roughly the
12th through the 15th centuries, but was eventually superceded by the King's
Bench at the beginning of the 17th century.'0 7 Social norm theorists, as well
as other advocates of customary law, frequently cite the Law Merchant as
among the most distinctive and successful instances of private ordering in the
history of British common law. 108 This admittedly archaic system is
compared and contrasted to contemporary trends in the mediation of
construction claims.
However dissimilar these forums may first appear, piepowder and
construction ADR actually share several important features. Both suggest
that self-ordering is optimal within groups whose members engage in
reciprocal relationships and share common goals. Where disputants have
such relationships, they will be more attuned to optimal social norms. In such
instances, time constraints and informality may actually enrich outcomes,
helping parties to focus less on procedure and more on reciprocal goals.
Mediation forums that serve the needs of such groups will be more likely to
produce fair and creative outcomes that deviate from adjudicative outcomes.
Disputants within such forums will therefore by less likely to engage in
predictive settlement.
resemblance to contemporary ADR, and so for the purposes of this Note I focus on them
in particular.
107 See BENSON, supra note 100, at 60-61.
108 Id. at 30. "Because the Law Merchant developed outside the constraints of
political boundaries and escaped the influence of political rulers for [so long] ... it
provides the best example of what a system of customary law can achieve." Id; see also
LEON TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 1-37
(1983); Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and
Mentschikoff: The Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV.
351 (1983) (comparing the early history of the Law Merchant to the Uniform
Commercial Code, which respects the social norms embodied by "customary practice,"
"course of dealings," and "usage of trade"); Cooter, supra note 2, at 1647-48 (describing
adjudication that fosters awareness of and deference to social norms as "a new law
merchant"). "Custom, not law, has been the fulcrum of commerce since the origins of
exchange. From the earliest times, merchants have devised their own business practices
and regulated their own conduct." TRAKMAN, supra, at 7-8; see also WYNDHAM ANSTIS
BEWEs, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT 19-24 (1923) (describing how the Law
Merchant's attention to custom produced substantive, and not simply procedural,
differences between its outcomes and those of the common law courts).
For a game theoretical model of the piepowder courts, see Paul R. Milogram et al.,
The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and
the Champagne Fairs, in REPUTATION, supra note 4, at 243, 248-62 (suggesting that,
even with imperfect communication between medieval merchants, ostracism could act as
a powerful sanction and ensure "honest" merchant practice).
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A. The Courts of Piepowder: The Early Arbitration of Customary
Mercantile Law
In medieval Europe (including England), the growth of markets
outstripped the powers of states to effectively monopolize regulation over
commerce. 109 From roughly the 12th through the 15th centuries, a significant
portion of British commerce was subject to quasi-private regulation. 10 Over
the course of these several centuries, commercial law developed at a distance
from the powers of the state, i l l regulated by mechanisms operating mainly
within the market. ' 1 2
The remarkable feature of this history is that the very merchants most
affected by this law oversaw the arena in which it was administered.1 13
109 MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 39. According to Mitchell, centralized jurisdiction
over commercial matters was "a late development, for it was but slowly that the central
authority became powerful enough to enforce a uniform system" of commercial law.
Even after centralization, the sovereign "did always see the necessity of establishing
separate courts of commerce." Id. at 40. For an excellent history of the rapid growth of
fair economies across Europe and the British lowlands, see 2 FERNAND BRAUDEL,
CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM 15TH-1 8TH C.: THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE 25-137 (Sian
Reynolds trans., 1992).
110 It would be an overstep to suppose that the Law Merchant was entirely private
justice. Even the temporary piepowder courts required the king's approval. Officially at
least, these courts' jurisdictions depended on royal franchise no less than common law
courts. But see Bane, supra note 108, at 353. Although royal franchise officially
determined local authority to hold a fair and its court, and the "mayor or bailiff of the
borough" might (or might not) be involved in the court's administration, "proceedings
were... highly informal, probably resembling more a street corner argument than a
modern trial." Id.
111 THOMAS EDWARD SCRUTrON, ELEMENTS OF MERCANTILE LAW 4 (1891).
According to Scrutton, "[i]f you read the law reports of the seventeenth century you will
be struck with one very remarkable fact; either Englishmen of that day did not engage in
commerce, or they appear not to have been litigious people in commercial matters, each
of which alternatives appears improbable." Scrutton notes that the explanation for this
remarkable absence is that piepowder (as well as other forums relying on admiralty and
merchant law) siphoned commercial disputes away from the King's Bench. Id.; see also 5
W.S. HOLDSWORTH, HOLDSWORTH'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: THE COMMON LAW AND
ITS RIVALS 105-06 (1927) ("It is therefore to the piepowder courts.., rather than to the
courts of the boroughs, that we must look, if we would trace the development of the
commercial law in England."). For a recent account of the competition between medieval
courts, see Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A
Supply-Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1551, 1582-89 (2003).
112 Milogram et al., supra note 108, at 262.
113 See W.E. LUNT, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 184 (1957). The judgment of the court
was "often found by a group of the merchants attending the fair, who were likely to be
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Adjudication of commercial disputes frequently occurred at the courts of the
fair (commonly known as piepowder). These forums "summon[ed]
merchants to testify about their customs" 114 and even relied on neutral
merchants to decide which evolving customs should be given deference. 115
In effect, the laws of the fair were the merchants' own evolving social norms.
Although granted powers of summary execution, 116 the decisions of these
courts were enforced largely on the basis of reputation and control of access
to the market. 117 Merchants who failed to comply with the orders of the
piepowder essentially lost their license to operate at the market.
A 13th-century English handbook on commercial law begins:
"Mercantile law [lex mercatoria] is thought to come from the market, and
thus we first need to know where markets are held from which such laws
derive."I 18 For commentators of the medieval period, merchant practice
constituted a "natural law of merchants." Courts applying the Law Merchant
took a unique interest in the actual customs of the disputants appearing
before them.119
Historical appreciation of the Law Merchant requires at least a cursory
look at how medieval traders conducted commerce. During this medieval
guided by a body of commercial laws and customs which the merchants ... had
developed by their own usage to meet their particular needs." Id.
114 MICHAEL E. TIGAR, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 56 (2d ed. 2000); see also
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 111, at 107, n.5 and accompanying text.
115 See MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 55, 61, 69, 173-74; see also 22 SELDEN
SOCIETY, SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT I, at xxv (1908).
116 BEWES, supra note 108, at 87.
117 See Milogram et al., supra note 108, at 243, 247, 263; BENSON, supra note 100,
at 33 ("Merchant court decisions were backed by threat of ostracism.").
118LEx MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM: A LATE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
TREATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE 1 (Mary Elizabeth Basile et al. trans. & eds., 1998)
(emphasis added). The translation of the complete handbook (originally titled Lex
Mercatoria) and often referred to by Holdsworth and others as "The Little Red Book of
Bristol," is included at the back of the volume and is individually paginated. That the
procedure of the fair courts was understood to be different from that of the common law
is expressed in the second chapter of the handbook. Although the Law Merchant shared
with medieval common law certain technical pleadings based on "writs" and "pledges,"
the author of "The Little Red Book" notes that "[t]he law of the market differs from the
common law of the kingdom. .. [in that] it generally delivers itself [of a judgment] more
quickly." Id. at 2. According to Trakman, "[o]ral proceedings, informal testimony of
witnesses and unwritten judicial decisionmaking were all essential ingredients" that
distinguished the Law Merchant from medieval common law. See TRAKMAN, supra note
108, at 13.
119 Bewes emphasizes that "the courts enforced the custom of the merchants."
BEWES, supra note 108, at 19; see also TRAKMAN, supra note 108, at 18.
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period the focal points of commerce were the fairs dotting continental Europe
and the British lowlands. 120 Mobile caravans of traders would station at
regular intervals near a population of agrarian consumers. 121 In England,
such fairs typically occupied the property of some well-to-do gentry (a lord
or bishop, for example) to whom the king had granted franchise, and who
secured a monopoly on rents. 122 There, traders would construct temporary
tents or booths. Trading would continue for several weeks, after which the
entire project would move on, thus creating a continuous circuit. 123
The fairs helped develop early international commerce. Since traders at
fairs could avoid the restrictions on foreign competition imposed by town
guilds, the fairs' expansion strengthened the connection between distant
points of the European economy. 124 These fairs also fueled widespread
speculation. 125 On the continent, especially at Champaign and Brie (the two
largest such fairs) historians have located the early origins of international
credit, bills of exchange, 126  and other innovations in negotiable
instruments. 127 Although smaller, the English fairs at London and
1203 FERNAND BRAUDEL, CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM 15TH-18TH C.: THE
PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD 111-12 (Sian Reynolds trans., 1992). Braudel and other
historians sometimes refer to all fairs as "Champaign fairs" after the site of Europe's
largest. See also TRAKMAN, supra note 108, at 19 (Champaign allowed the innovation
and blending of "distinctive usages and customs").
121 3 BRAUDEL, supra note 120, at 111.
122 LUNT, supra note 113, at 183.
123 3 BRAUDEL, supra note 120, at 111.
124 The Law Merchant has been called "the private international law of the Middle
Ages." MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 1; see also TRAKMAN, supra note 108, at 8. Insofar
as merchant courts emphasized the dependability of customary practice, the Law
Merchant could be described as having a "cosmopolitan" flair, since it was derived no
less from the customs of Italian financiers, Flemish manufacturers, and German exporters
than from English law and practice. According to Holdsworth, when dealing with
foreigners, the commercial courts sometimes allowed the practice of forming "a jury of
half-native half-foreign" and "[s]pecial rules were made where one of the parties to a suit
wished to rely upon a document which.., was in a foreign country." 5 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 111, at 104. Zywicki notes that the origins of the Law Merchant in the "city-
states of Italy" led to its "fortuitous ... cross-fertilization with Canon law." Zywicki,
supra note 111, at 1593-94. It was "fortuitous" because it afforded the Law Merchant a
"universalizing" quality, as well as a preoccupation with matters of equity. Id. at 1594.
125 3 BRAUDEL, supra note 120, at 112.
126 Bane, supra note 108, at 354-55; see also 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 111, at
96-97.
127 3 BRAUDEL, supra note 120, at 112; see also BENSON, supra note 100, at 34-35.
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Winchester, as well as St. Ives, Northampton, and Stamford, also linked
British merchants with wholesalers on the continent. 
128
The increasing complexity of trade inevitably resulted in disputes among
merchants, as well as between merchants and purchasers. Some adjudicative
authority was required to settle such matters as they arose. The merchants
demanded, however, that the resolution of such disputes meet two
requirements. First, given the temporary existence of the fair at any one
station, the process had to be swift and its justice prompt because the era's
lengthy and complex judicial pleadings were not feasible given the transitory
stays of the itinerate traders.129 Second, its standards could not be that of the
local borough or shire, an ostensibly alien and frequently protectionist justice
to which it made little sense for itinerate merchants to conform. 130 Rather, its
"law" had to suit the customs of the merchants operating the fair. The courts
of piepowder originated from the satisfaction of these dual requirements.
Their name is a corruption of the medieval French pied poudr , or "dirty
feet." The precise etiology of the word is debatable, 31 but its application to a
merchant court surely implied its rough, informal character.
128 LUNT, supra note 113, at 183. But see 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 111, at 113.
For a useful map of the towns connected to the Champaign Fairs of the 12th and 13th
centuries, see 3 BRAUDEL, supra note 120, at 113.
129 Holdsworth notes that complicated medieval pleading devices were sharply
abridged in "all medieval commercial courts throughout Europe." See 5 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 111, at 106. "Pleas were begun without writ, formalities were assuaged, few
essoins were allowed, and an answer to the summons was expected within a day, often
indeed within an hour." See id. (citing GROSS, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW MERCHANT
(Date unknown)).
130 The Crown recognized foreign traders as necessary components of capital
growth, and generally protected their interests. In essence, the fairs were treated as "free
trade" zones. In 1353, the Statute of the Staple was passed. Among its achievements, it
codified certain protections afforded to foreign merchants who traded in staple goods
(e.g., wool and leather). Although the courts of Staple "were expressly instructed to apply
the law merchant and commercial custom and not the common law," foreigners charged
there could appeal to the King's Bench decisions made under the Law Merchant.
Zywicki, supra note 111, at 1598. Benson has argued that this innovation, ostensibly
aimed at protecting international trade, was an early step towards the common law's
eventual complete authority over commercial affairs, and the end of the piepowder
system. See BENSON, supra note 100, at 60-61; cf 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 111, at
116.
131 See LUNT, supra note 113, at 183 (describing the word piepowder as "signifying
that the court was so informal that traders... could come into the Court just as they
were."); cf Bane, supra note 108, at 353 (describing the same word as "referring to the
shoes of the itinerant merchants who traded goods at the fairs").
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To us modems, informality is certainly piepowder's most distinctive
feature. For example, disputes might be resolved in a tent or shack. 132 This
informality hastened administration; the speed at which the courts of
piepowder settled disputes has no modem equivalent. 133 Certain facts
indicate the degree to which merchants wished to safeguard this feature of
the courts. Most telling perhaps is that lawyers-viewed with suspicion as
purveyors of the tediously formal-were generally denied entrance to the
piepowder courts. 134 Since their jurisdiction depended on the consensus of
the parties in dispute, 135 the piepowder courts were able to decide matters
otherwise unjusticiable at early common law. 136
A skeptic might suppose that control by merchants of their own legal
regime might have led to protectionism and cartelization 137 among
merchants, making itinerate merchants tend to uphold rules favoring sellers
132 See Bane, supra note 108, at 353.
133 In a 1458 Colchester case, a creditor brought suit on a £60 debt at eight o'clock
in the morning. The Court summoned the defendant (a fair attendee) once each hour from
nine o'clock to noon. Since the debtor failed to appear, the court entered judgment
against him by default. By four o'clock that afternoon, the plaintiff had attached the
debtor's property and the matter was deemed decisively concluded. See 22 SELDEN
SOCIETY, supra note 115, at 122-25.
134 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 111, at 96.
135 By paying rents at the fair, merchants voluntary accepted its jurisdiction. See 22
SELDEN SOCIETY, supra note 115, at xx-xxii; see also Milogram et al., supra note 108, at
247 ("Ostracism played an important role here, for merchants that failed to abide by the
decisions of the judges would not be merchants for long.").
136 Bane, supra note 108, at 353-54. Piepowder courts enforced informal and oral
agreements at a time when formalism prevented common-law courts from adjudicating
anything but written contracts under seal. See also TRAKMAN, supra note 108, at 12-14.
Contracts providing for the payment of interest-illegal and unenforceable at common
law-were "lawfully charged... at fairs," as was the interest on unpaid accounts.
BEWES, supra note 108, at 23.
137 A common criticism of private bargaining systems is that the rules produced will
tend to favor the interests of "repeat-player" at the expense of "one-shot" disputants. See
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 19, 26-28 (1999); cf
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves " Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974). Few courts would seem in as imminent danger
of that possibility as piepowder, since it was actually overseen to a large degree by the
merchants themselves. Yet, insofar as the Law Merchant innovated rules protecting the
equities of purchasers as well as sellers, and of foreigners as well as locals, this does not
seem to have occurred. See TRAKMAN, supra note 108, at 9. "A utilitarian ideal in the
form of maximal benefit to all-princes, merchants and consumers alike-offered the
Law Merchant its most solid foundation." Id.
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at the expense of purchasers, or natives over foreigners, for example. What
evidence is available seems to contradict that hypothesis, however. By
medieval standards, piepowder had a reputation not only for speed, but also
for fairness. The protection of bona fide purchasers originated with the Law
Merchant, 138 as did certain equitable defenses to contract including mistake,
fraud, and duress. 13 9 It innovated warranties of quality, 140 as well as
distinctive theories of agency that are still enforced today.14 1 Within
piepowder, married women who were traders could enforce contracts-a
novelty disallowed at common law. 142 Procedural devices offered foreign
traders protection from local cartels. 143 The piepowder courts also adopted
the custom of Muslim traders that "gross inadequacy of price involves the
inference of deceptions."' 144 Piepowder did not merely reduce disputants'
transaction costs. By limiting medieval pleading requirements and relying on
merchant customs, it also contributed substantively to legal decisionmaking.
Many of these contributions were later incorporated into the common law.
Piepowder's presence as a legitimate "competitor" to the official legal
system effectively provided supply-side market pressures for the widespread
adoption of efficient legal rules.145
The history of piepowder, which this Note has merely outlined, merits
serious attention by the ADR community. It provides an early example of a
decentralized forum, improving distributions of value within a social network
precisely because it adopted the social norms of the community it regulated.
It also indicates that such decentralization can serve the broader interest of
justice. During crucial periods of growth and transformation for the European
economy, the Law Merchant helped to develop the moral authority of the law
by resolving disputes flexibly, and in accordance with emerging customs.1
46
138 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 129 (1990).
139 Zywicki, supra note 111, at 1594.
140 Id. at 1599; 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 111, at 110.
141 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 111, at 110-11.
142 Id. at 104.
143 See supra note 125.
144 BEWES, supra note 108, at 24.
145 Zywicki, supra note 111, at 1622. The "presence of competition among legal
systems forced courts to provide laws conducive to private ordering and.., rooted in
custom. The freedom of the parties to choose their law meant that law had to conform to
their preferences and expectations." Id. (emphasis added).
146 Lon Fuller famously contrasted legal positivism with his concept of an internal
morality of the law" based on reciprocity and expectations (social norms). LON FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW 24 (1964). He regarded the exchanges of "economic traders" as
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By focusing on the actual practices of disputants (their social norms), rather
than simply devising legal rules, piepowder ultimately served to evolve
merchant practice. Lon Fuller's description of mediation therefore applies to
piepowder as well, since it not only relied on existing social norms, but also
furthered the "creation of the relevant norms themselves. 147
This episode from the distant past also offers practical suggestions for
how ADR fora ought to be crafted. It indicates, in a concrete way, what
models of social norms merely suggest: that norm enforcement maintained
within a discrete network (and with only minimal reliance on state
enforcement) can distribute resources in optimal ways. Institutions that look
beyond the scope of formal rules, and focus on the shared goals of their
members, will more easily adapt social norms that uphold all interested
parties' expectations of value. They will also be more capable of coalescing
as an organic whole, as a project.
Besides harnessing the feeling of reciprocity that lies at the heart of all
market transactions (the sense of a deal), piepowder facilitated the shared
purpose of those who submitted to its jurisdiction, taking as its goal the
organization of commerce within the fair. By focusing directly on this
objective (generally shared by all fair attendees), it was able to balance the
interests of sellers and purchasers, stewards and kings, foreigners and
locals. 148
models on which to base the law's moral foundation. Id. at 19-24. He recognized that the
"economics of exchange," on which all commercial law is based, require certain "fixed
points" (broadly speaking, property and contract). Id. at 28. These fixtures must
nevertheless be flexible enough to sustain evolving social conditions:
Without a self-sacrificing deference toward[s] [the institutions of property and
contract], a regime of exchange would lose its anchorage and no one would occupy
a sufficiently stable position to know what he had to offer or what he could count on
receiving from another. On the other hand, the rigidities of property and contract
must be held within their proper boundaries. If they reach beyond those boundaries,
society's effort to direct its resources toward their most effective use is frustrated by
a system of vested personal and institutional interests ... a kind of property right
reaching beyond its proper domain.
Id. at 28. At a time when emerging markets were unstable, and the formal laws of
property and contract were rigid to the extreme, the Law Merchant effectively charted a
middle course. It did this by acknowledging the necessity of economic institutions and by
directing its management towards maximum economic efficiency, based on merchant
custom. See Zywicki, supra note 111, at 1593-96.
147 Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 308
(1971).
148 See TRAKMAN, supra note 108, at 9.
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Although the piepowder courts share binding outcomes with
contemporary arbitration, 149 their procedures suggest optimal conditions for
decentralized recognition and enforcement of evolving social norms, an
orientation that links it to mediation. 150 Where a social network is well
demarcated, where timeliness necessitates that legal formalities give way to
the careful assessment of custom and reciprocal needs, efficient social norms
have the best chance to flourish.
B. The Construction Industry Embraces Mediation
The specialized ADR procedures that have emerged in the construction
industry over the past two decades share, to a remarkable degree, the
methodology and goals of the medieval Law Merchant. Not only are
architects, owners, contractors, and subcontractors locked into reciprocal
relationships, but they are typically directed toward a common objective (the
contracted project). Timeliness is essential when managing construction
disputes. Procedures must be readily available so that parties can settle
disputes quickly enough to avoid "downstream" losses. Within the
construction industry, resorting to the courthouse, or even just involving
lawyers, raises other parties' suspicions that the instigator intends to defect
from the project. As disputes arise, parties have incentives to maintain
mutually profitable relationships, even with those whom they disagree.
Under precisely these sorts of conditions, disputants will tend to rely on
social norms and evolve these norms optimally.
The construction industry experiments with alternatives to litigation with
special volatility.' 5 ' As early as the vast canal projects of the 19th century,
Anglo-American contractors have deferred to neutral experts (frequently, the
149 BEWES, supra note 108, at 87 (stating that piepowder courts possessed "rights of
summary execution").
150 While binding arbitration merely affords a different conclusive outcome and
other non-binding ADR (e.g., minitrial, summary jury trial, and early neutral evaluation)
all tend to absorb the "logic" of predictive settlement, only mediation can produce an
outcome based on the parties' own perception of their extra-legal norms and interests. In
this way, it actually has more potential to satisfy the parties' conclusions about what
should constitute the appropriate social norm.
151 See Darrick M. Mix, Note, ADR in the Construction Industry: Continuing the
Development of a More Efficient Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 463, 464 (1997). Mix describes how experiments with arbitration in the 1960s
and 1970s gave way to soaring litigation in the 1980s, followed by "renewed efforts to
arbitrate disputes," as well as novel interest in "new means of ADR ... available to
resolve disputes." Id.
1017
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
project's own design professional) to resolve their disputes. 152 In the past
several decades, the construction industry has been among the most
prominent patrons of emerging ADR technologies. Given its history of
adopting new dispute resolution techniques quickly, 153 some commentators
have recognized the construction industry as a model for the industry-wide
mainstreaming of ADR fora.154
Just as the ephemeral duration of itinerant trading-fairs spurred
piepowder courts towards the "swift resolution of disputes with a minimum
of procedural formalities,"'155 so the urgency of large-scale construction is
especially suited to the expedited treatment ADR permits. A construction
project succeeds or fails according to its work schedule. When disputes arise,
timely resolution is essential, or else downstream subcontractors and owners
suffer, and profits dwindle.
In construction industry parlance, disputes are commonly referred to as
"claims." Identifying and managing these claims quickly and effectively is a
vital part of all large-scale construction projects. 156 The variety of such
claims is as infinite as the mistakes that can happen inside a complex
construction project. The universe of construction disputes covers everything
from bidding disputes, problems with site conditions, and subcontractor and
owner delays, to coordination and financing problems, material shortages,
insurance and surety issues, the warranty of habitability, design flaws, and
liabilities for defects or unforeseen extra work.
While the parties must be prepared to manage such claims should they
arise, preparing for every contingency beforehand raises transaction costs
prohibitively. After all, both the origins and consequences of many claims
will be unique. Even if they are not, such claims frequently involve technical
subject matters, so that just discussing them requires both a "unique
vocabulary" and a "frame of reference" inaccessible to non-experts. 157 The
152 JUSTIN SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION LAW 3 8-39 (1997).
153 See Stipanowich, supra note 63, at 67.
154 See id. at 68; see also BARBARA ASHLEY PHILLIPS, THE MEDIATION FIELD GUIDE
223-36 (2001).
155 Zywicki, supra note 111, at 1597.
156 See PAUL LEVIN, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT CLAIMS, CHANGES & DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 8-18 (2d ed. 1998); see also American Institute of Architects, Form AIA
A201, reprinted in id. at 186-87.
157 James R. Madison, Suitability of Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes for
Resolving Construction Disputes, in ADR: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO RESOLVE
CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES 11, 11-12 (Alan E. Harris et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter A
PRACTICAL GUIDE]. The author discusses the limited ability of juries to decide such
matters as: "The beam might keep the floor from collapsing, but was sufficient account
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many different kinds of expertise needed to develop a property, combined
with the intricate partnerships required to ensure its completion, can create
disputes that have repercussions too complex for most courtrooms.
Although construction claims are overwhelmingly disputes in
contract, 158 the relevant documents acquire their meaning only in the context
of the legal and social norms that exist within the industry-what some
lawyers for the industry refer to as the "principles of construction law."'159
Like the Law Merchant of the medieval period, the principles of construction
law have legal implications but are shaped overwhelmingly by industry-wide
social norms. 160 It is helpful to think of claims as having a norm-enforcing
function, what Levin calls the industry's "standard operating procedures."'16 1
Although the industry recognizes that claims arise primarily from
confusions over contract, 162 contractors realize that perfect construction
taken of deflection to make the floor useful? The shop drawing dimension were accurate,
but were the bolt holes accessible to the worker in the field?" Id. at 11.
158 See Mix, supra note 151, at 465.
159 See LEVIN, supra note 156, at 4.
Interpretation and resolution of contract disputes is not limited to the contract
documents. Trade custom and practice has significant meaning in how
contractors prepare and carry out the plans and specifications .... The body of
construction law and practices, informally referred to as the "principles of
construction law," are well established and have changed little in the past 20
years.
Id.
160 We may compare contemporary construction law principles with Benson's
description of lex mercatoria as "customary law." Both terms encompass practical rules
of thumb as well as substantive law; both are eminently adapted to the reciprocal
requirements of commerce. BENSON, supra note 100, at 30-35; see also Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform in a Transactional
System, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 463, 469, 471-522 (1998). In the construction industry,
"ordering principles in the form of public (or external) law are often of secondary
importance to discrete relationships and rules of provenance internal to the industry." Id.
This is achieved via "extensively integrated" contract documents. Id. at 469. Simply
having normal working knowledge of the documents engineers rely on demands
knowledge of construction law principles. A Manhattan mediator who specializes in
construction disputes has disparaged the ability of lawyers to correctly interpret such
documents: "[M]any... think a blueprint is a lithograph from one of Picasso's early
creative periods." Gary Morgerman, Construction Mediation, Inc., Anatomy of a
Construction Mediation (1996), available at http://www.cminco.com/anatomy.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2005).
161 LEVIN, supra note 156, at 2.
162 The standard form construction contract promulgated by the American Institute
of Architects (ALA) defines a claim as "a written demand or written assertion by one of
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contracts would entail prohibitive transaction costs. 163 Already, standard
contracts have grown in the face of mounting concerns over legal risk,
resulting in parties' nervous distrust of one another from the outset. 164 While
it might be possible to fix contractually binding rules at the beginning of each
new partnering, it is often more efficient to propagate and enforce industry-
wide recognition of norms. 165 In this way, parties' claims on contract depend
not simply on the written documents, but on "the rights, customs, and
practices that comprise [construction law] principles."' 166
The crucial problem is how to apply those gap-filling principles when the
parties to a construction contract fall into dispute. 167 Because non-expert
decisionmakers typically do not properly understand the evidence in
construction cases, it is possible in highly litigious environments for
sophisticated lawyers-acting partly as free riders but also as client-centered
advocates-to hijack the litigation process. 168 Technical discovery can be
used to great effect in distorting the facts, especially where a judge or jury is
the parties seeking, as a matter of right, adjustment or interpretation of contract terms,
payment of money, extension of time or other relief with respect to the terms of the
Contract." Id.
163 Id. at 5.
164 See Stipanowich, supra note 63, at 73.
165 Id. at 66 (citing Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic
Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L.
REV. 854, 879 (1978)). Stipanowich finds abundant evidence in construction law to
support the theory that, "while the broader legal framework provides some assistance in
assuring enforcement of provisions and fills gaps, effective governance of the
relationship demands a structure which recognizes the specific character and context of
the transaction." Id.
166 LEVIN, supra note 156, at 4.
167 The issue is how to abate a party's recourse to litigation in those situations where
substantive law might afford better outcomes than would standard industry norms.
168 See PHILLIPS, supra note 154, at 226. At the high water mark of industry-wide
litigation, it was common for well-represented contractors to win contracts (especially
public ones) by bidding low and then expanding their profit margin by litigating extra
work claims. Such behavior prompted observations like this one from construction
industry counsel:
Construction litigation has been lucrative for the legal profession. Provided the
amounts in dispute are large enough, a construction case normally requires a large
legal effort. Extensive factual investigation is the rule. Research of legal cases is
extensive by reason of the complex nature of most of the precedent. Witnesses are
numerous and diverse in their knowledge of the case. The sum of this is normally
many documents, long hours, extensive depositions, large bills, happy partners,
unhappy spouses, etc.
Robert Coulson, What is ADR?, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 157, at 1.
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devoid of the necessary expertise to reduce the dispute to its essentials. 169 As
precedents make an increasingly sharp divergence from construction law
principles, litigation intensifies. In the 1980s, at the peak of an industry-wide
litigation "crisis," a third of all commercial construction projects wound up
being litigated. 170 Ultimately, skyrocketing insurance premiums halted this
seemingly inexorable litigiousness, 171 in turn prompting renewed interest in
ADR techniques. Perhaps there is no better evidence of ADR's efficiency
than its economic impact on construction liability and industry insurance
premiums.
Reputable contractors increasingly seek out neutrals with construction
expertise to help them settle ("manage") their claims rather than let them go
to court. 172 Since "[c]onstruction disputes may often demand a high level of
experience and knowledge on the part of decisionmakers,"' 173 one of ADR's
169 The Army's Construction Contract Negotiating Guide warns:
Most contractors realize that ... the less specific knowledge the government
representatives possess, the more easily their judgment can be influenced.
Consequently... the contractor will pass over a vulnerable point by presenting an
abundance of information on the point, seemingly with good intentions, but actually
with the aim of misdirecting ....
LEVIN, supra note 156, at 125 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, OFFICER OF THE CHIEF OF
ENGINEERS, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT NEGOTIATING GUIDE 8-9 (1974)). Although the
Army's Negotiating Guide describes this "misdirection" in the context of contract
negotiations, judges face virtually identical scenarios when adjudicating claims. In one
especially complex case, the presiding judge began pretrial by urging the parties to settle;
40 days, 41 witnesses, and 1,056 exhibits later, he felt it worthwhile to include these
remarks in his published opinion:
In present day thinking, it seems to be the idea that any problem can be cured in a
Federal District Court. This, I assure you, is an erroneous approach .... Lawyers in
their zeal to represent their clients many times fail to see but one side of the
litigation .... This litigation is not a one-sided bit of litigation, [sic] it is a five-sided
bit of litigation .... [R]emember the courts do not create litigation, it is created by
the litigants .... You litigants are in a fairly closely related field. Being trained in
this field, you are in a far better position to adjust your differences than those
untrained in these related fields. As an illustration, I, who have had no training
whatsoever in engineering, had to determine whether or not the emergency generator
system proposed to be furnished... met the specifications, when experts couldn't
agree. That is a strange bit of logic.
E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 387 F. Supp. 1001, 1005-06 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
170 See PHILLIPS, supra note 154, at 225-26.
17 1 Id. at 226.
172 See Mix, supra note 151, at 468. Instead of relying on expert witnesses, parties
may agree on neutrals with sufficient "knowledge and experience in the construction
industry" to obviate the need for expensive testimony. Id.
173 Id. at 469.
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most important benefits is that it offers parties mutually-agreeable recourse
to reputable experts. Just as piepowder courts depended crucially on the
guidance of neutral merchants, construction ADR frequently relies on neutral
intermediaries with construction expertise. 174 For the same reason, judges
have incentives to recognize clauses in contracts that assign decisionmaking
roles to third party experts. 175
Beyond the evidentiary difficulties imposed by construction cases, the
codified law in this area has yet to be made uniform. Because construction
law is not regulated under a single formal code such as the Uniform
Commercial Code, 176 contract interpretation proceeds in a "transactional"
fashion, inviting the application of normative standards, but frequently
requiring the contracting parties to reach agreement on specific courses of
action. The evolution of decentralized industry norms is crucial for operating
within a transactional regime. 177
174 See H. Murray Hohns, The Value of an Expert in Today's ADR Forum, in A
PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 157, at 299, 301-02 (describing that in the mediation of
construction claims, a "neutral expert" may act either as an investigator or may help
"teach the client what is involved"). Precisely because of the expertise required, judges
will avoid construction litigation if at all possible, and will pass off to experienced special
masters the frequently monumental discovery schedules such cases entail. See Charles M.
Sink, Special Masters: ADR's Last Clear Chance Before Trial, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE,
supra note 157, at 253, 253. "Trial judges loathe construction lawsuits." Id. Judges faced
with this prospect increasingly invoke Rule 53(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and appoint a special master. While Rule 53(b) requires that "[a] reference to a master
shall be the exception and not the rule" (FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b)), in practice both the judge
and the parties have strong incentives to consent to appointment. Sink, supra, at 255.
Among the "Desirable Qualities" of the special master, Sink includes a "specialized
knowledge of construction problems, methods, and terminology" including "a command
of insurance law, suretyship, and construction financing," as well as (most importantly)
"the respect and trust of all sides." Id. at 255-56. The rapidity with which many judges
appoint special masters in construction cases may be further evidence for Robert Baruch
Bush's prediction that courts will respond to ADR by integrating its strengths into their
own court procedure. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Alternative Futures: Imagining How
ADR May Affect the Court System in Coming Decades, 15 REv. LrTIG. 455, 460-62
(1996).
175 See, e.g., Grenier v. Compratt Constr. Co., 454 A.2d 1289, 1291 (Conn. 1983)
(finding that clauses in contracts delegating controversial decisions to design
professionals should be treated as valid conditions of satisfaction).
176 Stipanowich, supra note 160, at 467 ("The transactional law of building design
and construction stands in sharp contrast to the UCC approach to commercial transactions
within its scope.").
177 See Stipanowich, supra note 63, at 70-71. "As a backdrop for negotiation of
relational conflict, the public legal system is only incidentally a system for cooperative
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The production, consideration, and evolution of these norms may be
aided by appropriate use of ADR. Increasingly, the construction industry has
adapted ADR processes, including such unique industry practices as internal
claim management,178 partnering, 179 and Dispute Review Boards (DRBs).180
Recent growth in the industry's use of mediation, in particular, suggests
that it may well become a norm all its own.181 A majority of construction
lawyers now report that it is not always necessary to engage in discovery
before mediating a dispute, a belief generally shared by other expert
consumers of mediation. 182
The construction industry has many of the features of social groups most
compatible with the development and evolution of optimal social norms.
problem solving." Id. at 70. Frequently it is necessary for the parties to reach a normative,
inner sense of reciprocity and fair-dealing that balances all interests:
[W]hile the broader legal framework provides some assistance in assuring that
contract terms are enforced and the inevitable gaps are filled, effective governance
of the relationship demands a structure which recognizes the specific character and
context of the transaction and embodies the norms which animate the relationship.
Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
178 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
179 See Mix, supra note 151, at 474-75 ("Partnering ... is touted as the means for
both building cooperation at the jobsite and for preventing disputes."). Because parties
who work together focus on their goals (future-oriented), they may be more likely to
avoid the sanctions and counter-sanctions that escalate a relationship away from optimal,
mutual productivity.
180 See Alan E. Harris, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the 21st Century, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSTRUCTION LAw 299, 302-03 (Enhada et al. eds., 2001). Dispute
Review Boards (DRBs) originated with the Army Corps of Engineers, and have become
popular with other public owners. Normally the contractor and the owner agree to select
specific DRB members before construction begins. This group then helps manage
conflict during the entire process. Like the merchant juries who served within piepowder,
DRBs express the interests of the wider construction and owner community. "Because of
their experience and their regular involvement in the project, DRB members are able to
issue prompt, reasoned decisions." Id. at 302.
181 See Stipanowich, supra note 63, at 108-10. Results of a 1994 study indicate that
the more experienced respondents were with mediation, the more likely they were to
engage in it early and often. Id. at 131-42; see Rogers & McEwen, supra note 72, at 842;
see also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
182 See Stipanowich, supra note 63, at 101. While many parties to mediation engage
in pre-ADR discovery (96% of respondents favor using it sometimes), over half of those
surveyed (60%) say that the use of mediation is appropriate without making formal
discovery. Id. Interestingly, respondents rated the legal expertise of the mediator
relatively unimportant compared to other variables (impartiality, management, and
creativity, for example). Id. at 104.
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What is more, industry members seem to have singled out mediation as an
ideal means to further this end.
IV. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The main purpose of this Note has been to suggest that predictive
settlement models are useful but incomprehensive. Like other law and
economic theories of rational choices, such models fail to account for extra-
legal incentives that frequently motivate people's choices-in this instance,
disputants' choices to settle. Treating these extra-legal incentives merely as
"transaction costs" is also deceptive, since social norms (ostensibly a kind of
"transaction cost") can improve net social utility in ways that legal rules
cannot. Under certain circumstances, the presence of reliable social norms
may cause people to ignore legal rules.183 Clients may especially find greater
satisfaction from settlements that conform to social norms rather than to
predictable legal outcomes, especially if this entails value-adding benefits,
like the preservation of relationships or enhanced reputations.
The behavior of expert consumers of mediation suggests that mediation
is maximally beneficial the earlier parties initiate it.184 When disputants
agree to mediate before formal discovery, customary practice and social
norms are likely to be especially relevant, since the parties will not have
invested as many resources into framing their dispute in strictly legal terms.
Especially within small networks made up of members who repeatedly
interact, mediation provides an ideal forum for private ordering. It affords
disputants' the opportunity to assess, at their own discretion, the relative
pertinence of legal rules, social norms, and personal interests. It also permits
parties with disagreements to consider whether their customary behavior is
actually efficient or not.
The ideas contained in this Note were born of a happy coincidence.
While in the process of writing it, I was enrolled in Nancy Rogers' mediation
practicum at the Ohio State University, a class that entails mediating small
claims disputes. While mediating settlement conferences between tenants and
landlords, I found that the parties quite frequently disregarded applicable in
terrorum statutes in their settlement agreements, even when the tenants had
cited these statutes in their original complaints and were aware of them. It
occurred to me that these parties were behaving irrationally, for had they
simply entered the courtroom, the tenants would surely have received larger
183 See supra note 7.
184 See Rogers & McEwen, supra note 72, at 843-44.
1024
[Vol. 20:3 20051
MEDIATION AND SOCIAL NORMS
awards.185 Sophisticated landlords understood this, and their tenants probably
did as well. Why then did they not include these punitives in their settlement
agreements? An observation by Ellickson suggested the answer:
According to leading property casebooks, the development of an
implied warranty of habitability was the capstone of the significant changes
in landlord-tenant law that occurred during the 1965-75 period... (citation
omitted)... [But an] observer of social norms should be skeptical of the
supposition that this legal change had revolutionary effects. 186
Just as the old rule of caveat lessee was probably too inefficient 187 to
have sustained optimal distributions of costs, tenants who simply seek
remuneration for costs unfairly borne are likely to overlook the "draconian
pro-tenant remedies available."1 88 Severe remedies are also frequently
available to tenants who can prove that their landlords held deposits unfairly.
Interestingly, parties who mediate such disputes do not always consider these
penalty damages relevant. Instead of settling under the shadow of the law,
parties in mediation are more likely to settle according to basic principles of
185 Local ordinances frequently impose double damages or other penalties on
landlords who fail to comply.
186 Ellickson, supra note 4, at 543-44.
187 Id. at 544. This is inefficient because the landlord, as the property's owner, will
usually have greater incentives to bear the risks and will typically be better equipped to
fix the problem. Additionally, tenants and landlords will, more often than not, be locked
into long-term relationships that foster reciprocity. Interestingly, my own uncorroborated
observations suggest that these norms endure even after termination of the lease,
contrasting with the view that "social norms [are] for ongoing relationships; state law [is]
for endgames." Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144
U. PA. L. REv. 2055, 2056 (1996).
Very probably, such in terrorum statutes were created to deal with "slum" landlords.
Because these property owners take larger risks (and face greater losses), they may have
abnormal incentives to redistribute these costs to any tenant who will bear them. Such
value distributions, once they become normative, degrade the social order (as anyone
who has ever listened to the prejudices of a slum landlord may attest). Countering them
requires public policies that engage law's punitive capacity. See supra notes 2, 100. But
because the law wields them against the crook, the simpleton, and the novice alike, it
sometimes heaps one inefficiency on top of another. In such instances, simply placing the
parties together with a neutral can facilitate greater awareness of the efficient social norm
and its rationale. It may even provide an opportunity to engage in a "norm-advocating"
process, whereby the mediator assists the offending party in gaining insight in to the
larger repercussions of his behavior. See Waldman, supra note 27, at 754 (noting that
norm-advbcating mediation is especially useful for those disputes that "implicated
important societal concerns and involved a vulnerable disputant").
188 Ellickson, supra note 4, at 544.
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fairness and reciprocity (social norms). Therefore, they will tend to assign
actual cost damages (including court costs and other collateral damages) to
the person most obligated to bear them, but will stop short of demanding
costs that are inefficient or irrational, no matter what their legal force. Of
course, such anecdotal evidence is no basis on which to draw solid
conclusions. What is required is actual data from mediated settlements, 189 so
that deviations from predicted legal outcomes may be measured.190 Nor need
such deviations, should they exist, be cited as evidence of mediation's flaws.
Rather, a deviation from predictive outcomes may result from precisely those
qualities that make mediation uniquely valuable.
As Fuller recognized, mediation has the capacity both to generate and
channel efficient social norms. Even when relationships are coming to an end
(as in the case of expired leases), parties in mediation may still volunteer to
step out from under the shadow of the law. In this case, they will choose to
negotiate on terms that depend not on statute and precedent, but on
reciprocity and custom. 191 Far from being a cause for concern, the layman's
reliance on social norms can improve mediation outcomes.
189 Fortunately or not, the law is replete with inefficient and counter-intuitive rules,
some of which are sure to be mediated at rates amenable for close study. Any small
claims court in the country would probably do the trick. Although strict confidentiality is
normally part and parcel to the mediation process, in my experience parties are generally
willing to admit court-affiliated observers to mediation sessions. It seems quite feasible
that parties might agree to sign a waiver for anonymous participation in a scientific study.
In the interest of unbiased scientific inquiry, the requirements of the double-blind study
should be implemented: Neither the mediator nor the parties must be aware that the
dependent variable is settlement amounts. Recording not only abortive mediation, but
also directly litigated contests would establish a baseline. The presence of, or consultation
with, a lawyer might be another independent variable of some significance.
190 See supra note 40 (describing several well-constructed empirical studies of
settlements deviating from predictable legal outcomes).
191 In my limited experience, I found that mediations frequently revolve around
questions of how the parties should have proceeded, and how their friendships or
business relationships deteriorated. Bargaining frequently entails not only threatened
legal action, but also potential social sanctions.
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